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I NTRODUCTION 
~~~~· The purpose of this inquiry is to consider 
whether or not clarity is essential to knowledge and whether 
vagueness can in the least characterize knowledge. 
We are not here investigating whether or not there are 
vague appearances, or ideas that are vague as to meaning, or 
even whether there is such a thing as knowledge of appearance 
or of ideas which are vague. For it must be admitted at the 
outset that many of our experiences are characterized by 
vagueness, that many of our ideas are vague in meaning, and 
that we possess or may possess knowledge of these experiences 
and ideas, however vague they may happen to be. We are rathe 
considering whether or not the knowledge that we have can it-
self be vague. 
Moreover, we are not concerned in this inquiry with any 
special theory of knowledge, but with a special requirement 
of knowledge. We must see whether or not knowledge, when 
accurately defined and analyzed, requires clarity as an es-
sentia l element; and whether or not knowledge thus defined 
and analyzed can be characterized at all by vagueness. In 
this study, therefore, we are seeking to determine what 
knowledge by definition implies as regards clarity and 
Furthermore, we are chiefly interested here in 
clarity and vagueness as applied to what the terms and grounds 
of knowledge are. We are not therefore concerned directly with 
these terms as applied to perception of the degree of evidence 
required f or knowledge. 
How the Subject Arose. The problem stated above has not 
been previously treated by anyone. From some quarters, how-
ever, it has been urged that knowledge is a mixture of clarity 
and vagueness, that all knowledge has to some extent the 
character of vagueness. The most conspicuous representative 
of this position is A. N. Wh itehead. B. Russell has also g iven 
uttera nce to a similar view. 
Several years ago the writer took a course under Professor 
Whitehead entitled, "Cosmologies: Ancient a nd M.odern." Nearly 
a third of the lectures touched in some measure upon the view 
of knowledge just referred to. According to this position, 
Descar tes a nd all tho s e who with him seek a kind ' of knowledge 
tha t i s clear, a nd without any vagueness characterizing it, 
have led us astray. For what we in their fashion make clear 
always succeeds only because we have left out something that 
is ess entia l to the very knowledge we have regarded as cl ear. 
We must, then, in Whitehead's opinion, regard knowledge a s a 
mixture of clarity and vagueness. 
The lectures referred to s timula ted t h e writer to enter 
upon -a sp ecia l study of what knowledge by its nature i mpl i es 
regarding clari t y and vaguenes s . The present inquiry i s the 
ou t co:ne of t ha t study. 'Nhi tehead' s position has for some time 
=-ff== II 
j· 
.I 
2 
seemed to the writer to merit close examination because it is 
I 
a repudiation of a trend in epistemology which vras started by 
Descartes and fostered by such eminent and able philosophers 
a s Locke and Hume. 
Method of Proce~ure. We must begin by defining our terms 
accurately. Chapter I consists of definitions of the three 
primary terms here used. In Chapter II we present the chief 
argument for the position that clarity is essential to knowl-
edge. Following this, we consider, in Chapter III, further 
reasons for that position. While indirectly the relation be-
t ween va gueness and knowledge is touched upon in earlier 
chapters, we present a detailed discussion of that topic in 
Chapter IV. Here we state Ylhitehead's position together with 
the chief considerations on which it is based. Chapter V is 
an attempt to show tha t vagueness cannot without contradiction 
be allowed to characterize knowledge, and that if vagueness is 
permitted to enter into knowledge at all the way is opened 
thereby to practices of thought which philosophy cannot well 
tolerate. In the final chapter, Chapter VI, we examine the 
objection that knowledge which is clear can reach only the 
regions that are less important for life. Here we suggest 
by actual procedure a possible way of meeting this difficulty. 
This chapter is thus merely tentative in character. An ex-
haustive treatment of the objection in question would of 
course lead us far afield. 
3 
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CHAPTER I 
DEFINITIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to define (1) knowledge, 
(2) clarity, and (3) vagueness. 
(1) Knowled~. Though one of the major concerns of phi-
losophy is epistemology, only in somewhat rare ' instances 
do we find the idea of knowledge justly conceived and 
properly treated. 1 From the standpoint of this investiga-
tion, however, we require first of all to define knowledge 
accurately, that is, as it really is. For otherwise our 
1. Aaron, for instance, states: "The word knowle~ is 
used here in a wide and loose sense •••• It is a generic term 
for all those experiences that are in any sense cognitive, 
including ••• opining, 'being under the impression that,' 
sense-perception and so on." (Art. 1, 203; cf. ib., 205) 
Again, Reichenbach begins the first chapter of a some-
what recent book by saying: "Every theory of knowledge must 
start from knowledge as a given sociological fact." (EAP, 3) 
He thus sets out with a curious assumption about knowledge 
which no theo.ry of knowledge can build upon. For episte-
mology, while knowledge may be regarded as in a sense given, 
it cannot soundly be viewed as a sociological fact. 
'Whitehead suggests that the notion of 'mere knowledge' 
is a high abstraction and should be dismissed from qur minds. 
(AOI, 5; cf. ib., 225-226) He declares also: "All knowledge 
is conscious discrimination of objects experienced. But this 
conscious discrimination, which is knowledge, is nothing 
more than an additional factor in the subjective form of 
the interplay of subject with object. (Ib., 227-228) Thus 
what is distinctive about knowledge is minimized and not 
held to be of any special importance. 
----
---
problem would be merely a question of definition. 
We may approach our definition best by way of belief. 
I ~.Villiam James says in a chapter on belief, "Everyone knows 
the difference between imagining a thing and believinl in 
its existence, between supposing a proposition and ac~ui­
escing in its truth." 2 And it is a matter of common[ ob-
servation that even a child does not confuse what he . egards 
as fact with what he views as fiction. "To him," as bhester-
1 
ton aptly puts it, "no two things could possibly be mbre 
totally contrary than playing at robbers and stealing sweets:3 
Our definition of belief, then, is this: Belief is con-
templation of objects as real or as valid. 4 
Belief (or opinion, which is another name for 
thing) takes itself as true, but of itself lacks 
grounds for validity. Everyone is familiar with 
the rame 
adeqrate 
the fact 
that his beliefs or opinions have often turned out to be 
untrue. Moreover, beliefs frequently contradict one inother. 
However intensely they may be affirmed, they may stil! be 
in error. They are just the sort of thing that may o~ may 
not be in error. Some beliefs are false, ~ome are trhe, 
-------·--
2. POP, II, 283. 
3. AUT, 39. 
4. It 
view of 
namely, 
I is obvious that we do not here have in mind the 
belief commonly expressed in religious c ircle1s, 
the persuasion of the truths of religion. I 
5 
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and some may be such that we cannot now determine whe1ther 
they are true or false. Mere belief, therefore, which in 
11 this fashion may sail under various flags without ha~ing to 
I exhibit its credentials, cannot be knowledge. Nothing could 
I 
be more palpable than that there is a great gulf separating 
I 
that 'chaos of conflicting prejudices called public o,pinion' 
from knowledge. 
While knowledge is not any and every kind of beli~f, 
kno wledge is unmistakably a case of belief, a certain kind 
I 
of belief. 5 Knowledge is the kind of belief that is seen 
to be true and not false; and this kind of belief, wnich is 
knowledge, we may call well-grounded belief. 6 The essential 
point about knowledge is that it is belief that is seen to 
be true. Knowledge is therefore a term within the subject-
matter of logic. Knowledge is by its very nature a logical 
affair. From the standpoint of this inquiry the logical 
I 
character of knowledge is of primary importance. 
(2) Clarity. 7 The term clarity plays at best an insig-
nificant role in epistemological studies of the present cen-
1 
5. For an excellent account of the relation between belief 
and knowledge see Moore, PS, 33-36. 
6. Dewey says that the abstract term "knowledge," l'is a 
name for the product of competent inquiries." But he pre-
fers the expression "warranted assertibility" to "knowledge." 
(LOG, 8-11) He also uses the expression "justifiable belief." 
(EAN, 15) It might be added that the words "product of com-
petent inquiries," are not specific enough. 
6 
\1 7. FTom the Latin clarus, meaning bright, brilliant, famous, j 
---=rr-g_l_o_r_io~s. (CDC, II, l037) -------~-=-It--=--=--=-=--=--
·----~ I 
I) 
I ? 
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tury. It is seldom singled out for special and careful 
definition of the sqrt that is essential here. 
Clarity applies only to representations. There are two 
fruitful ways of defining it: first, from the standpoi!nt of a 
common usage of that term; second, from that of logic. we 
may call the former sensory clarity and the latter logical 
clarity. Even though we are here primarily concerned ]only 
with the latter, an understanding of the former will put us on j 
our guard against the possibility of confusing the two. We 
consider these, then, in the order given and seek first to an-
swer the question: What is sensory clarity? I 
Nearly everyone is familiar with what happens when r e look 
out upon a distant object through a field glass that is ill 
adjusted to our eyes. All that we see is something in~efinite, 1 blurred, hazy; something whose nature is not at all sharply , 
I I 
defined. But when we adjust the field glass to our eyes, the 
distant object is brought near, so to speak, and what hppears 
is no longer indefinite, blurred, hazy, but clear. 8 Th~ s is a 
common us;e ." of the term clear, and we all know what i ~ means. 
• • I 
Any appearance is clear that has the character of defih iteness,l 
of determinateness in nature, and that has sharply def ~ned and 
easily recognizable limits, ~ach feature of which is d!istinct. 9 
Frequently an unclear appearance is due to some obs ~acle 
-~T~;:-:::-:f the term clarity is derived from the l en. se of I 
sight and it is most natural for writers on optics to pse it 
io. re_gard to visiQn as they do. (Cf CDC, bi, 103?) It lb.a~ been. 
1 :tn.ghtry used in rererence to c1ass1ea.l ar't. ( · !. wtnftlinj,KG, ·17) 1 
er. It is manifest that there may be degrees of sensoryularity. ' 
-:-:=1::1==== ·----------------'-'--- ----------·--·-----·-·-----------~ -- --- -
1! 
eyes and attempt to see some remote object. This is the case 
I when the sound of music is nearly (though not complete 'ly) shut 
out by the closing of a door so that we are unable to say more 
than that we hear some sort of sounds. 
I 
Sometimes, however, an unclear appearance is due to, the 
I ' fact that the external object itself lacks well-defined limits. ' 
While in such a case we cannot speak of the object i ts,elf as 
unclear, we certainly must call the appearance unclea~. A 
fog, for instance, has for us an unclear appearance just as 
I 
an object blurred by the field glass does. 
An instance of sensory clarity in touch is this. In ex-
perimental psychology one test is performed by taking tan in-
1 strument with two points on it which can be adjusted so that 
I these points are far apart or near together as the test re-
I quires. With the points about a quarter of an inch apart, let 
I 
us say, they are touched to the tip of the forefinger and are 
clearly felt as two. If they are kept the same dista~ce apart 
and applied to the lip, they are still felt clearly as two. 
• I 
But if they are placed upon the back of the hand it may be dif-
ficult to determine whether they are sensed as two or as one. 
In the first two instances the s ensation is clear, wh'ereas in 
the latter it is unclear. 
Remembered images of what we have seen, heard, f elt, etc. 
may also be clear, in the sense of that .term_., that ·,we :lie.t e .have 
- -·---···- ··-------·-- ---------- ------====-==------=----· --- --·------- ------ ----------------------------
in mind. For they too may, ~ in:''a manner similar to th~ exa.J:11Plee 
given above, be definite, determinate, and have sharply de-
l 
fined limits. I 
Turning from sensory clarity to the logical we mus ~ now 
1 k f t th . t · Wh t · 1 · t · I · t oo or an answer o _e ques 1on: a 1s c ar1 y 1n 1 s 
I logical connotation? While it is important to know what we 
I 
I 
mean by sensory clarity in order to avoid any possibility of 
I 
I 
confusing it with logical clarity, we are in this inquiry 
I 
required above all to present an accurate definition of the 
latter. The definition of logical clarity, then, is the 
second fundamental definition of this study. I 
The name of Descartes has come to be associated wi ~ha 
more philosophical use of the concept of clarity than l the one 
discussed above. 10 The expression "clear and distinct ideas" 
I 
promptly suggests his name. The method of doubt with i which 
he launched modern philosophy contains as a cardinal feature 
I 
an emphasis on a kind of logical clarity. we may therefore 
profitably lead up to our definition of the term by f ~ rst 
considering some of Descartes's utterances on the sub ~ ect. 
He was particularly interested in the way clarity !relates 
to intuition and deduction, which, together, are viewed by 
10. For the most complete account of this phase of 
Descartes's thought see his Regulae and the popular s~­
mary of his philosophy .in the D1scours (OEuvres, X anCl VI 
respectively). Cf. Gibson, POD, 151-152. 
9 
11 him as the only roads to certain knowledge. Philosophy, 
I 
he insists, demands clarity, freedom from doubt in what we 
behold. It likewise demands certainty, freedom from doubt 
in what we deduce. He declares: 
Circa objecta proposita, non quid alij sen-
serint, vel quid ipsi suspicemur, sed quid 
clare & evidenter possimus intueri, vel certo 
deducere, quaerendum r~t; non aliter enim 
scientia acquiritur. 
Descartes defines intuition and deduction with special 
I 
emphasis on clarity. He says of the former that it means, 
I 
not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the mis-
I 
leading judgments resting on fancies, ".§.ed mentis--12.1:U:ae & 
attentae tam_f~il~ distin~tumque CQU£~umL vt deo eQ, 
I 
~od intelligimus, nulla prorsus dubitatio reling~-
tur •••• " 13 In deduction, according to him, the mind moves 
from intuitions in a continuous and uninterrupted process 
with a clear vision,of each step that it takes. 14 1 rr 
I 
there is any doubt about a step taken the process i1 fal-
11. OEu~, X, 368-369. Cf. ib., 372. 
I 
12. Ib., 366. (When more than three lines are quoted 
from a foreign language, underscoring will not be used.) 
13. Ib., 368. In SPBU, III, 165, we are told that for 
Descartes "clarity is immediate intuition •••• " Descartes's 
view of clarity here is of course closely bound up with 
his doctrine of innate ideas. (Cf. OEuvres, X, 523-524; 
and ib., 373, 376, See also ib., VIII, 15-16, 22-23) 
14. QEuv~, X, 369. 
10 
~ 
I 
I 
1 . · ·d b · I ac1.ous. Sl.nce 1. eas may e 1.n error, he urges "as the first 
condition of infallibility, that they must be clear.111 15 
We are now ready to answer the question: What is c!la.rity I 
in the logical sense of that term? Descart.es, as the! above 
remarks show, is urging, among other things, that thel mind 
must be free from doubt regarding the objects of its thought. 
It must have a clear hold upon all that it beholds for pur-
poses of thought. Here we encounter a very different] thing 
from sensory clarity. We are now confronted with thJ use 
of the term clarity as applied to the ~aning of our ideas. 
Clarity in t h e logical sense, then, refers to the wal in 
which we apprehend the meaning of those ideas which we 
employ in thinking. 
An idea, logically speaking, is conscious content lwith 
a. meaning, with a reference to something other than , tself. 
The term "concept" is perhaps less confusing than "i1ea." 
These two will here be used interchangeably to refer to any 
conscious content which has a meaning, or which stands for 
something other than itself. An idea. or concept is 1n ob-
ject of thought whereby we intend to refer to someth~ng, 
and the meaning of an idea or concept is simply what Jver we 
we intend by it. For instance, we may contemplate a concept 
-----------------
15. Peirce, CPP, v, 249. As 
Descartes also held tha t ideas 
I 
I 
we shall presently see, 
must be distinct. 
11 
-----------
i! 
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I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
il 
that we name "clock." Vlhat do we mean by it? We mea:n, 
. 
that is, we intend, those properties that all partictilar 
I 
clocks possess in common. This is what we mean by the 
general concept clock.- We may entertain the idea of a par-
I 
ticular clock. In this case, we mean or intend some special 
clock as distinguished from all other clocks and all ,other 
things. 
The problem here, then, is to define clarity in reference 
to the meaning of ideas or concepts. What do we mean when 
we speak of a clear concept? A concept is clear when the 
mind apprehends specifically and without ambiguity or doubt 
what that concept refers to, what is intended by it. 1 If we 
do not grasp specifically what a concept means, so that we 
cannot in our own minds determine what we intend by it, that 
concept is not to us clear. If there is ambiguity about what 
we intend, if two or more distinct objects are inten4ed by 
the same concept, the meaning cannot be clearly appr~hended 
and the concept is confused with something which it is not. 
If we are doubtful about what we intend by a concept~ so 
that it is floating about without any fixed meaning, we 
I 
cannot claim clarity in regard to that concept. Once more, 
all ideas or concepts which the mind grasps specifically 
and without ambiguity or doubt, so that there is no mistake 
about what that mind intends by them, are clear. 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
12 
It ---------------. 
I 
Clear ideas are such that any two of them which are dis-
tinct can be mutually defined or outlined over against each 
I 
other, so that the most ingenious person could not deceive 
I 
us, or confuse us, or mislead us about their meaning. 
1 . d . t• t 16 C ar1ty an~1s 1nc ness. These terms have been closely 
I 
associated with each other in the history of modern philos-
17 I 
ophy. For this reason, and more particularly because a 
-----.,.---
16. The terms "clear" and "distinct" were first used to-
gether by wri t ers on optics. ''Clear vis ion occurs wb!ere 
there is suf f icient light; distinct-vision, where the parts 
of the object seen can be recognized. Descartes extended 
the terms to the mental apprehension of truth, which he con-
sidered analogous to vision." (CDC, II, 1037) 
17. Cf. Descartes, OEuvres, VI, VIII, and X. See par-
ticularly ib., VIII, 22. 
Cf. Locke, Essa;v I I, xxix, and his "Epistle to the Reader" 
in Fraser, LE, I, 22. 
Cf. Leibniz, Pholos. Schriftmh IV, 422-426 and 449-450; 
also ib., V, 236-244. 1 
Locke and Leibniz, in their treatment of clarity and dis-
tinctness, give especially illuminating suggestions. ' Locke 
hblds tha~ our simpl·e ~ idep.s . a:re . Cl,ear 'When .. they remain like 
that which is presented in a well-ordered perception from 
whence ·chey are derived. (;~ssay, II, xxix, Sec. 2. C:f. his 
use of ''determinate" and 11 determined" in Fraser, LE, I, 22) 
"A distinct idea," he tells us, "is that wherein the lmind 
perce1ves a difference from all other •••• " {Essal, II, 
xxix, Sec. 4) 
In Leibniz's view, "Clara ••• cognitio est, cum habeo unde 
~-reJ!raesentatam agnoscere J!Ossim •••• 11 (Philos. Sc!u:ifteu, 
IV, 422. Cf. ib., V, 236, 237) To know clearly, according to 
him, is to know without being in the slightest doubt. (Ib., 
IV, 449) A distinct notion, on the other hand, is ome which 
is so known that we are able to mark out its peculiarities 
from other notions. (Ib., 423. Cf. ib., 449) 
13 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
------W-----
1 
1
11 
definition of distinctness sheds light upon the meaning of 
I clarity, we require to understand their relations. 
\I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
We have seen that clarity applies to the meaning of ideas 
or concepts. A concept is clear when the mind apprehends 
I just what it intends by that concept. Clarity is thus a 
\ 
term that applies chiefly to our perception of the meaning 
of single (though of course not isolated) concepts. 
An idea ,is distinct, on the other hand, when it stands 
over against some idea which has a different meaning. It is 
distinct, as Leibniz suggests, in virtue of peculiarities 
which attach to it only and not to an idea with which it is 
compared or contrasted. 18 It is distinct in virtue ,of the 
attributes peculiar to it which mark it out as different 
I 
from and not to be confused with some other idea. Our idea 
of Mars, for example, is different from that of the moon. 
\Vhatever is peculiar to our idea of Mars as contrasted with 
what we experience as the moon makes the former distinct 
from the latter. Here the emphasis rests not so rnuc~ upon 
the manner of apprehending~~ idea (as in the case of clarity) 
as upon the the differences between one idea and another or 
other ideas• 
It _now appears that clarity and distinctness bear 1 directly 
18. Philos. Schriften, IV, 423, 449. 
=~===--- --- --
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1
' upon each o~er. The question of distinctness need not ex-
plicitly arise when we are .contemplating a clear idea. But 
t I every clear idea is implicitly distinct in the sense that 
\I 
II 
I 
it cannot be confused with any other idea. Every clear idea 
would be seen to be distinct if we chose to compare i~ with 
other ideas. This is true because otherwise one clear idea 
might be merged or mixed with another and different clear 
idea or with any different idea; and this would involve con-
I 
tradiction. The point is that every clear idea is a deter-
-r---
minate idea w~th particular qualities which must be distinct 
from qualities that a different idea may have. The moment 
I 
we !ntend something specific by an idea, the way is paved to 
distinctness; distinctness is implicitly there. 
Without clarity, to view the matter from a somewhat dif-
ferent angle, distinctness is itself impossible. We must 
perceive specifically, without ambiguity or doubt, what we 
intend by an idea before that idea can be fruitfully com-
pared to and contrasted with another idea (which likewise 
must be clear). Otherwise we cannot determi-ne wherein the 
distinctness of the idea in question is. 
I 
For if what we 
I 
intend by either idea is ambiguous or doubtful and inexactly 
known, in so far we cannot grasp wherein each is distinct. 
It may of course be that two ideas are so obviously dif-
ferent, though they may not seem to be clear, that th1eir 
distinctness is at once perceived. Suppose, for instance, 
------·----- -1 
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someone on the street were asked, "Are democracy and die-
tatorship distinct from each other?" The person responding 
might not have a clear idea of either idea and yet apparently 
know that the two are distinct. But if he actually knows 
' 
that the two are distinct he must have some clear idea about 
each of them. Otherwise his supposed knowledge is simply 
conjecture or is based merely on hearsay. Unless he could 
call up in his mind some clear characteristic of democracy 
and of dictatorship, his utterances on the distinctness of 
the two are not warranted. 
In summary, clarity, as the term is used in this inquiry, 
concerns our apprehension of the meaning of ideas. An idea 
I 
is clear when we apprehend specifically and without ambiguity 
or doubt what we intend by it. Distinctness is implicit in 
I 
every clear idea, and clarity is essential to distinctness. 
. . 19 (3) Vagueness. ~ A - poet may say, "Who speaks o~ vague-
ness should himself be vague," but in this inquiry we cannot 
follow his lead. We require to know exactly what is meant 
by vagueness. I • Since this term has been applied in var1ous 
19. The term comes from the Latin Vigus, meaning wandering, 
inconstant, uncertain, rambling, stro ling. From th,e same 
source are the following words: vagabond, vagant, vagrant, 
vagary, extravagant, etc. (Cf. NED, X, 13; and CDC, X, 6685) 
I 
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ways, we must here be careful to distinguish between its 
meanings and thus avoid confusion about what we intend by 
vagueness for the purposes of this study. Three kinds of 
I 
vagueness may profitably be considered here: first, sensory 
I 
vagueness (as opposed to sensory clarity), verbal vagueness, 
and logical vagueness. Let us view these i~ order. 
What is sensory vagueness? Perhaps we may see best what 
I 
it is by the following story. A traveler gazed anxiously 
I 
from the bow of a steamer just entering a Japanese port. He 
was looking for the famous Mt . Fujiyama which he knew to be 
in that vicinity. There was a ·sort of mist in the afr which 
made it very difficult to see any great distance. Nothing, 
therefore, which resembled the beloved object which he desired 
so intensely to behold was in sight. After a while one who 
had previously seen the mountain and who knew just where to 
look, tapped him on the shoulder and pointed to a somewhat 
I 
large grayish object whose outline appeared so dimly as hardly 
to be trace·able. "That," he said, "is Mt. Fujiyama. 11 
Now that appearance was vague because it was indefinite, 
indeterminate, and not sharply defined in nature. I Any ap-
I 
pearance is vague, in this sense, that is indefinite, inde-
terminate, and whose limits are not sharply defined.1 
Our experience of a fog or mist also is an instance of 
sensory vagueness. A very difterent example of sens'ory 
vagueness is the awareness that VIe frequently have of our 
bodily processes. When we suffer a sharp pain, there is 
17 
a sort of awareness which we have described above as se1nsory 
clarity. But when the body is functioning normally we are 
frequently aware .of it in a way that we may call vague, for 
that awareness lacks the character of definiteness, of being 
determinate, and of being sharply defined. This is se~sory 
vagueness. 
Perhaps the best example of sensory vagueness is the ap-
pearance to us of a blurred photograph. The photograp~ of 
a friend may be so blurred that we are hardly able to recog-
nize anything in it. Its appearance is vague because that 
I 
appearance lacks any well-defined and determinate nature. 
Verbal vagueness is quite a different thing. For a ~ long 
I 
time vagueness has been used to characterize words. Rvssell 
devotes a considerable portion of an article to the subject 
of vagueness in language. He there attempts to prove 1that 
all language 20 is vague. What does he mean when he says that 
all words are in a sense vague? He suggests an answer to this 
I 
question when he discusses the words "red" and "bald." These, 
like all other words, are attributable without doubt over a 
certain area, but there is a region wherein we become !doubtful 
about their applicability. Their vagueness is due to ,the fact 
that they become questionable when they are applied beyond 
I 
I 
certain limits. For example, when does the color red 1cease to 
20. Art. 1, 84. Cf. Cohen and Nagel, LSM, 224-225; and 
Ogden and Richards, MOM, 15. 
18 
I 
19 
==~========================================~====-
·I 
.!, 
be red and become pink? First, let us say, ·it is unmis tak-
1 
I 
ably red. Gradually the color changes toward pinkness until 
we are in doubt about just what the color is. The word red, 
then, is vague in so far as it lacks exact, sharply marked 
regions of applicability. Again (to cite a familiar case) 
I 
how many hairs can a man have and still be bald? we should 
I 
hardly hesitate to call him bald if he had but ten hairs to 
I 
crown his glory. In this instance too there is no exact 
reference attached to the word "bald" as it is commonly used. 
words, then, are vague when we cannot assign them any definite 
boundary or limits of applicability. 21 According to ,Russell, 
I 
vagueness is opposed to accuracy. 22 I A map is accurate if it 
is an exact representation of real territory. A word is accu-
rate when it has precise limits of applicability. 
Now, it is important once more to emphasize that neither 
the sensory connotation of vagueness nor that as applied to 
words is what we require above all else here. :aut th1e latter 
----------·------·-----
21. Cf. Rus sell, Art. 1, 88. 
22. c. s. Peirce has also devoted some attention td a defi-
nition of vagueness. In harmony with Russell's view he holds, 
according to Buchler, that the contrary of the term 11 vague 11 
is "definite" or "precise." (CPE, 23) But he adds a~ im-
portant point. Petree affirms that anything is vague to which 
the principle of contradiction does not apply. For example, 
we may say, 11 this is a melancholy day." (Cf. Buchler, CPE, 
25) Tb '·· so- · fa.r as the word "melancholy" is vague we are unable 
to apply the principle of contradiction because of its vague-
ness. This suggests the logical definition of vagueness 
toward which the discussion in the text above is moving. 
i is so closely related to vagueness in the logical sense of 
I 
that term that 6.ur:.discuss ion of verbal vagueness lead~ us 
at least to the edge of t~e third fundamental definiti bn 
I 
of this inquiry, namely, the definition of vagueness i~ its 
logical connotation. I 
I 
Vagueness, like clarity, may characterize the meani~ of 
our ideas. What do we mean by logical vagueness, by v~gue-
1 
ness as applied to the meaning of our ideas? We answe~ this 
I question, as we did in our definition of clarity, by showing 
I 
I 
what sort of idea or concept is vague. A concept is v
1
ague 
when we do not perceive exactly what we intend by it, ~ hen 
we are unsettled (every time we try to specify it) as regards 
I 
I 
its meaning. The meaning, in such a case, may float about 
from place to place on the surface of thought without being 
fixed, determined, definite, specified. 23 There is always 
I 
in the mind a certain hesitancy and fluctuation as reJards 
I 
the meaning of a vague idea whenever an effort is madt to 
specify that meaning. j 
A large number of common notions may be called vagye· 
Someone has spoken of the "general vagueness as to th or-
dinary duties of mankind." 24 That is, our ideas on s 
23. Cf. NED, X, 13; and CDC, X, 6685. The term " 
applied to the Egyptian· year because it (the year) b 
sometimes at one season and sometimes at another. 
gests in a concrete manner the nature of vagueness. 
24. Cf. NED, X, 13. 
e 11 is 
20 
)I 
I' 
II 
II 
-----·---==-=-=-======---------·-···--
subject ~re ··often :'not prec·i s·e and . specif-ied .. as . to. -meaning. 
For many people "freedom" is a vague idea. They are aware 
that they in tend something b:>r it. They may even feel that 
I 
they intend something definite by it. They would probably be 
sure t hat there is at least some latent meaning worth ;inquir-
ing into. But since they have not taken the trouble to 
locate specifically what they mean by freedom, it remains 
for them vague. 
In a mystery story by R. A. Freeman there is an ex9ellent 
example of vagueness. A clergyman, upon visiting his . brother 
after a long absence, finds the latter dangerously ill. He 
felt that there was something odd about his brother's con-
dition and wondered particularly why nobody had sent him 
word about the state of affairs. After thinking a while the 
clergyman decided to visit the doctor who, supposedl~, had 
been caring for the patient. Not many words of greeting were 
passed between the two men before the clergyman came ' straight 
to the point. 
"May I ask what, exactly, is the matter with 
him." 
The doctor heaved a patient sigh and put his , 
fingertips together. 
"The word 'exactly,'" he replied, with a faint 
smile, "makes your question a little difficult 
to answer. There are so many things the matter: 
with him. For the last twenty years, on and otf, 
I have attended him, and during the whole of 
that time his health has been unsatisfactory--
most unsatisfactory. His digestion has always 
been defective, his circulation feeble, he has 
had functional trouble with his heart, and 
'I 
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I 
I throughout the winter months, more or less 
continuous respiratory troubles •••• " 25 
When the doctor was pressed to answer the question as ~o 
what exactly was causing the trouble at that particular time, 
he took refuge in vagueness. His idea about the cause was 
vague. 
Just as we related clarity and distinctness above, we may 
profitably examine the relation between vagueness and con-
fusion. confusion results from outlining two or more distinct 
ideas one upon the other. For example, a person might use 
' 
the term "utilitarianism" as a synonym for "pragmatism." 
I 
This would be an instance of confusion, because two distinct 
ideas are made to overlap upon each other. Confusion,, then, 
is the opposite of distinctness. Vagueness, on the other 
I 
hand, is more properly contrasted with clarity. For these 
both have to do chiefly with our apprehension of individual 
ideas or concepts. Of course, strictly speaking, we do not 
perceive isolated meanings. But the point is that when we 
are considering vagueness and clarity our emphasis is de-
cidedly upon what we intend by particular ideas or concepts 
and not upon their distinctness from or relation to some 
other ideas or concepts. It is manifest that while vague 
ideas are not necessarily confused they may easily become so. 
:25. ATN, 12-13. 
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I Herein is one primary difference between clear and vague 
concepts. The former cannot be confused but the latt J r are 
in constant danger of being confused. 
One further character of vagueness, in this logica] sense, 
needs to be mentioned. Peirce has suggested that anyJhing 
is vague to which the principle of contradiction does ,
1
1not 
26 
apply. While this is too broad a statement, we rna~ note 
that the principle of contradiction cannot be applied to any 
assertion about vague ideas. That is, in so far as t He 
ideas are vague the principle of contradiction is hel+ ess 
and cannot be applied. For until we grasp definitely lwhat 
we have in mind we cannot apply to our assertions about it 
the principle of contradiction. 
Summari• We have before us now definitions of the three 
primary concepts of this inquiry; knowledge, clarity, 
1
and 
vagueness. Knowledge is well-grounded belief. Clarity ap-
plies to a.ll concepts whose meaning we apprehend specilfica.lly 
and without ambiguity or doubt. Vagueness likewise co[ncerns 
the meaning of our ideas or concepts. These are vagu, when 
we do not apprehend exactly what we intend by them, bJ t grasp 
their meaning only with hesitancy and misgivings whenever we 
try to specify what we have in mind. 
26. Cf. Buchler, CPE, 25. Cf. above, 19, n. 22. 
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CHAPTER II 
CLARITY AND KNOWLEDGE 
Int~~~tion. The purpose of this chapter is to ex, mine 
how clarity relates (1) to knowledge in general, and (2) to 
two distinguishable levels of knowledge, namely, knowl J dge 
with the warrant of certainty, and knowledge with the , ar-
rant of probability. More particularly, we aim here t9 · 
I 
consider whether or not clarity is essential to knowle, ge, 
(1) Clarity and Knowledge in Gene~l· These two te ,ms 
II have both been defined above, but they have not as yet been 
related to each other. We have already seen that both 
I knowledge and clarity are concepts of logic. The part]cular 
question before us here is this: Is clarity essential J o 
well-grounded belief, or knowledge? 
In knowledge there is always something known and th, 
reasons for its being known. The first may be called j he 
"what" and the second the "why" of knowledge. Analysi , 
shows that clarity is essential to both of these. We urn 
first to the relation between clarity and the what of 
knowledge, the content of knowledge. 
i 
I 
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Unless we apprehend exactly and without b . ·t I am 1gu~ y or 
doubt ::!hat is known, we cannot justly claim knowledge in 
that matter. For there can be no way of justifying a belief 
of any sort unless we have a clear idea of the belief to be 
tested. An example which is selected because it is t~pical 
will enable us to see the cogency of this argument. 
Someone might boldly assert, "Beethoven was not a great 
I 
man." Another person, however, might challenge that :~remark 
and declare with equal vigor, "Beethoven was indeed a very 
great man." For our purposes here, and for the sake of the 
I 
argument, we mayaccept Matthew Arnold's definition o1 
greatness from his essay on "Sweetness and Light," whl' ch 
runs as follows: 
Greatness is a spiritual condition worthy to 
excite love, interest, and admiration; and 
1
1 
the outward proof of possessing greatness is 
that we excite love, interest, and admiration. 1 
I 
we have now before us two beliefs which, as they stand, are 
flatly at variance with each other. Unless we apprehl nd 
clearly just what each belief contains we have no way of 
ascertaining whether or not either is warranted. The 
truth of this will appear as we consider the two beliefs in 
closer detail. 
Suppose the first person, in order to show that his ut-
1. PAP, 260. 
I' 
25 
-------
II 
I II 
I 
I 
l 
I I' 26 
____________________ j ___ _ 
----- I 
terance is well-grounded, presented his case by saying ~ 
I 
"Beethoven was unattractive, unsightly, had a pock-marked 
face, spoke in dialect, was very proud, gave way to fi f s of 
temper followed often by deep contrition, frequently changed 
his lodgings (sometimes taking several at the same timk), 
was in many practical affairs almost a martyr to indec ~ sion, 
was not thoughtful of others when he practiced his mus ~c late 
into the night, had no regular hours of working, never l 
learned nor wished to learn :· etiquette, was once (durihg the 
composition of his Mass in D) even arrested as a tramp l and 
I 
was refused marriage in one instance because he was no f only 
ugly but regarded as half crazy. 2 Therefore I maintain he 
was not a great man." 
But the second person, who has refrained from interrupting 
the former only by dint of rigorous self-control, expr~sses 
his case with equally intense earnestness in these woras: 
"But Beethoven ought to be viewed with special regard ~or 
his music. His nine symphonies alone entitle him to oLr 
affedtion, interest, and admiration. His sonatas for ~ iano, 
his opera, concertos, and other compositions justify uk in 
acclaiming him a great man. 
high standing play his music 
2. Cf. Turner, BEE, 35-55. 
Today symphony orchestras of 
more often than they do t~t 
-t+-----
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of any other composer. We might even go beyond his mu ical 
talent and find much about the man which furnishes add Jtional 
evidence for his greatness. He held Immamlel Kant in + gh 
regard and was particularly impressed with the philosopher's 
classic utterance on the starry heavens above and the doral 
! 
law within. He had the depth of insight to say of one lof the 
greatest literary figures of all time, 'Goethe lives and we 
3 I can all live with him. '• I conclude, then, that Beeth'oven 
I was a very great man." 
1 
In view of the two arguments above it would seem pal~able 
that without a clear understanding of just what each be!lief 
in. question contains, no way can be devised for justify!ing 
either of them, for holding either as knowledge. If, f~r 
• I instance, the first speaker 1ntends to assert that Beethoven 
was in no sense a great man, then his evidence is not s hf-
ficient to warrant that position. If, on the other han~ , 
he means to affirm that Beethoven was not in some resperl ts 
a great man, then his evidence is manifestly sufficient to 
I justify his case. There are some aspects of Beethoven' i 
life and character which do not excite Arnold's essentials, 
1. 
namely, love, interest, and admiration. Similar reasonang 
applies to the second speaker's belief. our conclusion must 
be that clarity is essential to the what,or content, of 
I 
------
3. Turner, BEE, 105. 
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knowledge. We re~uire to perceive specifically and without 
I 
ambiguity or doubt just what is known or is claimed to be 
known, for otherwise we cannot determine that it is really 
a case of knowledge. I 
I 
Moreover, knowledge is impossible without a clear ap-
1 prehension of the ~rounds which permit a belief to reach 
I 
the level knowledge. For if we do not perceive clearly 
what the grounds are, in any given instance of what we claim 
I 
to be knowledge, we cannot determine that they are real 
grounds. 
The following illustration, which like the one given above 
is typical, will make this point concrete and show how it is 
valid. In Korea, the "Land of Morning Calm," there was a 
I 
time when many people believed that diseases are caused by 
evil spirits. This belief was not devoid of what seemed to 
I 
be good grounds. For one thing, they believed that the 
I 
world is peopled with all manner of spirits, eighty percent 
I 
of which are evil. Secondly, they believed that disease is 
I 
definitely an evil and hence is caused by evil powers. In 
addition, they may have perceived that sick people act dif-
ferently from their normal selves and hence that they have 
I 
in them a force other than themselves. In all events, the 
I 
belief was not without some sort of grounds. So solid was 
the belief for many Koreans that they were willing to inflict 
and suffer numerous trials in order to get rid of the evil 
29 
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spirit or spirits causing malady. In some cases a needle 
would be inserted into a portion of the body where pain was 
keenest in order to let out the evil spirit. In othen in-
stances a shaman, usually either a mudang (sorceress able 
to persuade evil spirits) or a Eansu (blind man with ~ower 
to control and command evil spirits), was hired and paid, 
for services frequently accompanied by much noise but llittle 
positive good. 
Once more, unless we apprehend clearly what grounds a 
I 
belief claims in its justification we cannot determine 
whether or not they are real grounds. We require to see 
I 
clearly what the grounds are before we can evaluate them as 
sufficient to warrant a belief. To return to the above 
. . I 
illustration, we may easily understand how 1t was that many 
Koreans (similar beliefs have been known among nearly lall 
peoples) came to believe that disease is brought on by evil 
spirits, and we would not find it difficult to lay hold upon 
I 
I 
the chief grounds for their belief. But when we see those 
grounds clearly, we are able also to observe that they do 
I 
not justify the belief and so are not real grounds. We now 
know that the belief that evil spirits cause diseases rested 
I 
on specious grounds. There is scarcely a shred of real 
evidence for the existence of such powers which, supposedly, 
can enter the body and bring with them sickness or evbn 
death. 
F=- ----·--· 
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the contrary, that many diseases are due 
to parasitic activity within the body. 
us about the validity of this belief. 
No one could mislead 
I 
It has unquestionable 
warrant. But if we did not have a clear hold upon the lgrounds 
for it we could not claim for this belief the status of 
knowledge. The grounds for it are the verified resultJ of' 
medical experiments. Typhus germs, for instance, are found 
I 
in a body suffering from typhus. This is invariably the case. II 
'I With the aid of microscopes we may see the germs. I We ~earn 
that healthy bodies are relatively free from such germs. 
• I Moreover, we know also by exper1ment that when the kind of 
germ causing the disease has been discovered, and when ap-
1 propriate treatment given which enables the body to carry on 
amounts to knowledge. 
we must, however, examine more closely the relation be-
tween clarity and knowledge. We have thus far seen thJ t 
clarity is essential to knowledge in general as distinguished 
I 
from different kinds or levels of knowledge. We must now 
consider how clarity relates to two unmistakable levels of 
I 
knowledge, namely, knowledge with the warrant of certainty 
Z>O 
--T 
and that with the warrant of probability. 4 The latter of 
I 
these is particularly important in this inquiry becaut e 
from some quarters vagueness might at least be urged as a 
character of probable knowledge. 
(2) Q.lari~nd Cert!!int;y. Grote, in his ~J2.1.Q.~Q. 
PhilosqRhica (1865), pointed out that there are two ways of 
knowing things. We may know them immediately and int~itivel~ 
or we may know them conceptually and representatively \ 5 
There is knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about (that 
is, by description). Grote's analysis is suggestive 1f a 
more useful way of distinguishing the two levels of kJ owl-
edge. There is knowledge with the warrant of certain{y, and 
that with the warrant of probability. The former is J nowl-
edge of immediate present experience and of purely fo llmal 
relations only. The latter includes our knowledge of the 
external world of process and events, and our knowledge of 
all that is not within present experience. The immedi ate 
I task before us is to discover how clarity relates to the 
former, to knowledge with the warrant of certainty • . 
What is certainty? Two kinds of certainty are usually 
distinguished in definitions o£ that term, namely, psJ -
4. Descartes, Locke, and Hume, however, would not i }clude 
the probable in knowledge. \ 
31 
5. ~· Phil., I, 60. Cf. Baldwin, DPP, I, 602. See [also 
James, MOT, 43. 
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chological and logical. 6 To these we add another, empirical 
I 
certainty, for reasons which will presently appear. 
I 
Psychological certainty--which we mention here so that 
there will be no confusion in our terms--is the feelidg or 
conviction of unquestioning assurance. Someone may sa!y, "I 
feel absolutely certain of this," or "there is not th~ 
slightest doubt about it in my mind," or "I cannot but be-
lieve that s.uch and such an event occurred." Yet, we know 
I 
that these and similar statements are no guarantee of the 
truth of the speaker's convictions. I The type of certitude 
which they voice is simply that of a mind in the state of 
unquestioning assurance. This is an entirely different 
I 
thing from the other kinds of certainty and is .not to .be 
I 
confused with them. 
I 
Logical certainty is a form of well-grounded belief or 
knowledge. It is belief about formal concepts and relations 
which have the highest degree of warrant. 7 It is beiief 
6. Cf. Adamson, Art. 1, 170-171; Lalande, VOC, I, 104-105; 
and Cohen and Nagel, LSM, 19. Leibniz speaks of a so~t of 
practical certainty as follows: "L'on pourroit prendre la 
certitude pour un~~issance de l~verite, avec la~uelle 
~n'en peut point dout~ar rapport a ~ractigue sans 
folie ••• •" (Philos. Schriften, v, 426}This, however, I is 
strictly speaking a very high degree of probability. 
7. Cf. Keynes, TOP, 10. 
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with. unmistakable and complete warrant because it canj ot be 
denied without contradiction. We cannot seriously enJertain 
the idea that the belief is false without contradictiJg , ~ur­
selves. It is certain because the law of contradictiJn is 
valid. 
Empirical certainty is the completely warranted belief 
that we now exist, that we now experience objects thatl con-
stitute the flow of present consciousness. 8 In this case 
the belief has unmistakable and complete warrant because it 
cannot be denied without being implicitly affirmed, aJd also 
because immediate awareness provides for itself an abJolute 
warrant. 9 Thus, in knowledge by acquaintance the acJuaint-
ance itself furnishes the warrant, and that warrant iJ ab-
solute. 
we are here concerned only with logical and empirical cer-
tainty, for only these are instances of knowledge. clarity 
I 
B. Rogers states in this vein that all intuitional ~rnths 
capable of certainty "are statements of what we actually 
discover to be the fact about our mental content at the 
moment •••• " (WIT, 3 '7) I 
33 
9. A very similar position was affirmed by Augustin~ and 
later by Descartes. It would not be out of place, therefore, 
to see briefly what they said in this vein. Augustine de-
clares: "Yet who ever doubts that he himself lives, a~d re-
members, and understands, and wills, and thinks, and fnows, 
and judges? Seeing that even if he doubts, he lives.·r·" (De . 
!r!.!!., x, 14) Descartes, in all probability, took Au~us tine's1~ 1 principle (see on this subject Gilson, RDD, 297; and Gibson, 
POD, 78, 100) and made it central in his philosophic method. 
The first unconditional fact, according to him, is fotind in ' 
the ·maxim: "~ens~donc je suis." (OEuvres, VI, 32~ 33; cf. 
ib._1_ VIII, rr.--:tl1-Tb.,x, 523, he puts it "dubi1Q.s. ergo ! sU!!!.!_") 
i====:::j:j::::::== 
I 
___ j 
----T ---------- --
j is essential to these two types of certainty. We consider 
them in order. 
Logical certainty is impossible without clarity. Ne be-
lief can justly be viewed as certain unless we perc~ive 
. I 
clearly what the belief is and whv it possesses unmistakable 
- -~ I 
and complete warrant. Whitehead has suggested that "the 
I 
science of Mathematics is the very citadel of the doctrine 
II I 
[l of certainty." 10 We may therefore turn, for an illustration 
j that will make this discussion concrete, to an elementary 
I proposition from rna thema tics. We all know that 2+2::4 •1 This 
1\ 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
il 
II 
I 
is a case of logical certainty. 11 Now, if there is ~o clear 
idea of what we mean by the numbers 2 and 4, and the sligns + 
and:, there is no possible way of believing with absolute 
warrant (or with any warrant at all) that 2+2=4. Moreover, 
if we do not perceive why the equation is valid, that 1is, if 
we do not apprehend clearly what the grounds for its ~alidity 
are, we cannot consider our belief warranted at all. 
1
The 
moment we see what the belief before us is and what its basis 
I 
is, we are able to perceive that it has the warrant of cer-
tainty. Clarity is in like manner a sine ~~ in all 
I 
10. Art. 1, 262. 
11. Mill has expressed the idea that in some world 2+2 
might= 5. Santayana is reported to have said, in commenting 
on Mill's notion: "In such a fertile world 2+2 might ~qual 5, 
but it would still be 4." This reply is decisive. 
1+==34 
I proofs of a purely formal · nature, that is, in all knowledge of 
formal relations. 
Empirical certainty is also impossible without clarity. 
If we do not grasp clearly what we mean by present consJious-
1 
I ness and what we mean by existence we cannot believe wi t h ab-
J solute warrant that present consciousness exists. But the 
lj moment we understand clearly what we mean by these, we lee 
II how the former, by definition, implies the latter. In t his 
case, it appears that as soon as our ideas are clear, the 
I present consciousness exists. 12 . 
1 ( 3) Clarity and Probabili ti:• Our aim in this section is 
I to define probability and to show how clarity is essent ~al 
to it. It is particularly important, from the standpoi, t of 
this inquiry, to examine the relation between clarity and 
11 probability, because in some quarters in might well ~e Jmagined 
that while clarity is essential to knowledge that has tJe 
warrant of certainty, it is by no means essential to kndwledge 
I with the warrant of probability, or what is less accura~ely 
called probable knowledge. I 
I, l 
1' 12. Rogers suggests that statements of intuitional tr ths 
1 are self-evidently valid "in so far as they continue to lseem 
with entire clearness an accurate account after repetition 
and the closest scrutiny we can give •••• In some cases the 
1 thing is so extremely clear that we refuse to admit the pos-
'I 
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\ sibility of mistake." (WIT, 37} 
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I 
Plato, Carneades, Butler, Bowne, and others have urged 
I 
that in the more important matters of life the best knowledge 
available is probable only. 13 Notwithstanding the long 
history of the notion of probability, 14 there are ma~ked 
differences of opinion regarding its nature. The term is dif-
ficult to define. We would be led far afield should we at-
I 
tempt to present a complete and fully adequate account of 
probability here. But its fundamental nature must be 1 ex-
hibited so that we may determine whether or not clarity is 
I 
necessary in knowledge that has the warrant of probability. 
I 
Broadly speaking, there are two prominent theories labout 
I 
the nature of probability. According to one, probability ap-
plies to beliefs only, 15 while in the other probability at-
1 
taches to events and -classes. The latter has been called 
the frequency theory of probability. 16 These we exa~ine in 
order. 
To what does probability apply? What is measured or 
13. Cf. Plato, Tim.; on Carneades see Windelband, HOP, 207; 
Butler, anal~, 2;-and Bowne, TTK, 179, 185, etc. I 
14. Aristotle uses the term in his !nal!...l:rio~ II,
1
27,70a 3 
where he says: 11 What men know to happen or not to happen, to 
be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a proba-
bility •••• " Leibniz urges in several places the impor ,tance of 
a science for estimating probabilities. (Cf. £hilos. Schriften 
V, 353) Hume applies the term particularly to reasonipg about 
cause and effect relations. (Treatise,Bk.I,Pt.III, Secs.ll-13) \ 
15. This would of course include propositions. jl 
16. Cf. Keynes, TOP, 92. 1i 
36 
li 'I 
~---~= -----~====c==~-~---=~t=37 
II weighed as probable? Jevons declares: II 
Rrobabill!Y_Qelongs whq~ly to the mind. This II 
is proved by the fact that different minds may 
regard the very same event at the same time with 
1 widely different degrees of probability. 17 I 
He then defines probability in terms of quantity of knowl-
edge. 18 
I 
A more careful statement of this approach to probability, 
I 
however, has been made by Keynes in his Treatise on Ptoba-
1 
£.ility. He says, "A definition of probability is not
1
pos-
,j 
sible, unless it contents us to define degrees of probability j 
relation by reference to degrees of rational belief." 19 He 1 
adds in a later passage, "Of probability we can say no more 
I 
than that it is a lower degree of rational belief than cer-
1 
tainty •••• " 20 Thus the term concerns the "grounds which 
lead us to entertain a rational preference for one belief 
over another." 21 Probability, then, applies not to events 
(for these are necessary) but to beliefs concerning events. 
This manner of viewing the subject, it should be noted, is 
also opposed to the notion that intensity of belief or feel-
-------· 
17. POS, 198. 
18. Ib., 199. 
19. TOP, 8. 
20. Ib., 15. 
21. Ib., 97. 
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ThJ ing of expectation is the measure of probability. 
ter is purely subjective anti has nothing directly 
whether or not a belief is warranted as probable. 
I 
to db 
lat-
with 
Mathematical probability (which in itself is a some~hat 
complicated subject) is perfectly consistent with this [ theory. 
I 
In those cases wherein all the possibilities are known and 
are equiprobable (such as in the toss of a coin) exact[ numeri-
22 I cal measurement is possible. That is, theoreticalliV, the 
· r f · I degree of warrant that a bel1e , or 1nstance, about the toss 
of a coin has, admits of mathematical formulation. 23 II 
The frequency theory of probability, though not original 
with Venn, has at his hands received classic expressioln. 24 
He declares that probability is not concerned with th~ "degree 
of our certainty or belief about things which we are supposed 
to contemplate." 25 For .belief may be due to interest and 
22. Keynes, TOP, 112. Cf. ib., 6. See also Chapman and 
Henle, FOL, 336-338. I 
23. It must be remembered that mathematical probabi ~ ity is 
not a t all determined by facts as they ?ccur, but as ~ormally 
they ought to. A perfectly balanced co1n, when tossed, has 
theoretically an equal chance of turning up heads as tails. 
But this may not in fact prove to be strictly the casJ. For 
instance, Jevons made 20,480 throws of a penny. Theor~tically, 
he should have got 10,240 heads. Actually the outc.ome was 
10, 353 heads. (Cf. Hibben, LOG, 337) 
24. Cf. his LOC. For a brief historical statement of 
theory of probability see Keynes, TOP, 92-93. I 
25. LOC, 3-4. Cf. ib., 65, 138. I 
I 
I 
I 
this 
I 
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feeling, and at best is fugitive and fleeting. 26 The follow-
ing illustration from Venn will bring out his central pbint. 
I The proposition, "Some cows ruminate," is true. If then I 
see one cow in a pasture by itself I cannot infer that it 
ruminates. But if I see a group of cows in a pasture I would 
be justified in affirming that, in all probability, some of 
I 
them were ruminant, and the warrant would become better in 
proportion to the number of cows about which I form an bpinion. 
I 
It is with such classes of things and such inferences that 
27 I 
probability is concerned. Though in regard to individual 
members of a class there is "disorder," an aggregate order 
prevails. 28 The occasional attributes in contrast with the 
I 
permanent are found, after extended examination, to tend to 
I 
exist "iU-SLcertain defini1!L:Q.ropQ£tio!!_Q.L,ihe..J!hole number 
29 I 
Q.L~§.·" When a long series of cases is considered, numer-
ical accuracy is attainable. The marks of probability, then, 
are found in properties of natural kinds, and in the "force 
f 1 . 30 and frequency o most natura agencles." 
II The frequency theory has been modified by some thinkfrs in 
, ______ _ 
26. Venn, LOG, 125-126. Cf. ib., 130. 
H----
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order to make room for propositions which do not admit of 
precise or numerical measurement. Here probability is I 
thought of as the "truth-frequency of types of arguments." 31 
I 
I 
Inferences of a certain class which are valid much more -
frequently than not are, according to this view, probable. 32 
I 
Of the two theories of probability presented above- 1 one 
represented by Keynes, the other by Venn--the former seems 
more nearly correct. Beliefs alone are the sort of thing 
I 
that can properly be called probable, for it is beliefs that 
are in question. But the essential point of the frequ~ncy 
theory can be interpreted in terms of what we may call the 
belief-theory of probability. For in a great many matters 
we can gain knowledge that has the warrant of probability only 
I 
by studying classes of events, the frequency with which cer-
tain occasional interruptions of the rule occur, etc. But 
I 
in these matters also it is belief that must be judged prob-
able. The belief happens to be about classes of events, 
about the frequency with which certain factors may be ex-
1 
pected, etc. An illustration from daily life will illuminate 
this point. 
It is probable that should I go shopping today I will 
not be struck by an automobile. I have been shopping 1many 
31. Cf. Cohen and Nagel, LSM, 169; and Keynes, TOP, 1101-102. 
32. Cf. Cohen and Nagel, LSM, 154. See especially Dewey, 
LOG, 470-479. 
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times in the section to which I intend to r eturn without being t---·-----
hit by a car. I know also that hundreds of people shopl there 
I 
daily without being struck by a car. I therefore conclude that 
I will not, in all probability, be struck by a car if I I decide 
to go shopping today. This inference is based upon a sprvey 
of a large number of cases (one could make an exact study of 
the problem and put it in terms of mathematics, as for :example, l 
insurance companies do along similar lines). It is a belief 
I 
concerning the chances a person has of doing his shopping 
1 
without being struck by an automobile. I know by expetience 
not occur frequently, I that accidents of the sort in question do 
but only rarely, and therefore my belief as stated above is 
. I 
warranted. By similar reasoning it would be easy to show that 
I 
the chances of being injured or killed are very high for a 
soldier engaged in modern warfare. The point here is, lhow-
ever, that what is essential to the frequency theory ~y be 
readily interpreted in terms of the belief-theory. 
I 
But one character of the frequency theory cannot be
1
allowed, 
without qualification, by the latter, namely, its insistence 
upon numerical exactness in all cases. (This, of course, does 
not apply to the modified form.) The reason for this is that 
I 
so rigid a requirement makes the notion of probability inap-
plicable to many of the most important matters about which we 
need to gain well-grounded beliefs and about which we cannot 
hope for certainty. There are in fact many beliefs which we 
entertain that have the warrant of probability without ad-
I 
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111 mi tting of numerical formulation as regards the exact degree 
I 
I 
of -tha:t warrant . 
II Probability, we may now say, is the degree of warrant that 
II beliefs possess. We may perceive its meaning more dist~nctly 
I I 
I 
\I 
I 
I 
by considering it in relation to certainty. Probability is a 
. I 
degree of warrant below the level of certainty and above that 
I 
of possibility. The difference between certainty and proba-
1 
bility has been suggested by Lewis in the following manner. 
I 
The proposition "A is B, " if certain, is such that it cannot I 
be otherwise . But the judgment "~ is B is probable," could be I 
true when "·A is B" is false. 33 This is the case because with 
probability the evidence is not sufficient for complete
1
warrant 
and no single possibility or theory can be selected which alone 
I 
can be free from contradiction. 
The last sentence introduces an important point about prob-
ability. Beliefs about the occurrence of future events (or 
about events and facts concernin~ the world of process) are 
warranted as probable only in relation to the various possible 
events,and only in relation to the evidence for the occurrence 
of each possibility. 
· Who will win the present war? This question can only be 
answered, if at all, in terms of probability. There are three 
I 
possibilities: Germany, the Allies, or neither (it may end in a 
,_ 
33 . MWO, 325. 
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deadlock, or both sides might conceivably agree to cease fight-
1 
ing). The belief that the Allies will win, if probable at all 
I 
(there are wide differences of opinion on this subject among 
I 
experts), is probable only in relation to the evidence now 
I 
available in support of that possibility and also in relation 
I 
to the evidence against that possibility. 
In a similar manner probability applies to theories about 
I 
facts and events, to believed theories. A theory about the 
I 
nature of the physical world, for example, may be belie
1
ved, 
and that belief may have the warrant of probability. B
1
ut here 
again it can have that warrant only in relation to the a lterna-
tive theories that the mind has in view, together with the 
evidence for each theory. 
Is wha t we call the physical world mental or non-mental in 
I 
character? There are here two alternative theories. If the 
belief that the physical world is mental in character is war-
ranted as probable, · it is probable only in _relation to the 
evidence for it an~. tb l the evidence in support of the other al- 1 
ternative. Thus probability is always relative. It is
1 
rela-
tive either to the possibilities and the evidence for them 
(as we saw above), or to the alternative theories and ~he evi-
dence for them. 
While in a sense beliefs with the warrant of probab~lity are 
relative, in another sense they are not. To be sure, they are 
always relative to the possibilities, to the alternative 
theories, and to the evidence for these. For the sake of em-
43 
1\ 
phasis we may repeat that a believed theory, for example, is 
prob1;3.ble only in relation to .. the alternative theories wJ ich 
have been considered and discarded as inferior to it. Jhe 
I 
II 
theory that has more or better evidence in its support t han any 
others is alone rightly believed. And that belief is wJrranted \ 
as probable. If a new alternative is suggested, or if J ew 
evidence turns up, the balance of probability may .requiJ e dras-
tic revision. But relative to the alternatives and the evi-
dence considered, the believed theory must certainly be Erob-
able before it can be classed as knowledgg. In this s Jnse 
-- I 
probability cannot be relative. We are now prepared to lshow 
how clarity is essential to probability. 
Clarity applies to knowledge that has the warrant of prob-
ability just as it does to that with the warrant of certainty. 
We require to see clearly what the belief in question i J , what 
the evidence for it is, what the alternatives (whether J os-
sible events or alternative theories) are, and what the evi-
dence for the alternatives is. In view of previous disdussions 
. I 
of a similar nature, · this point need not be greatly elaborated. 
I 
If we do not apprehend clearly what the belief in qu~stion 
is, whether it be a belief about facts, events, or theo llies, 
then surely we cannot determine whether it is warranted at all. 
I 
suppose we have no clear grasp of the various possibilities or 
. I I alternative theories and of the evidence for each of these, but 
I perceive with clarity only one possibility or theory wi1h only 
\ the evidence for it. Our belief could not then be warranted as 
.I 
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11 probable. For no belief is rendered probable except in rela-
II tion to alternative possible beliefs which we view as cqndi-
/ dates for knowledge. Therefore, in the case of probability we 
require to apprehend clearly not only the accepted or believed 
I alternative, but also all the possible alternatives that we re-
I\ 
' gard as relevant. i 
1
i Furthermore, we require clarity as regards the evidence or 
grounds for the believed alternative and for the relevant pos-
sible alternatives. For if we apprehend this evidence only 
vaguely, in a hesitant, unsettled fashion, then we cannot de-
termine that the evidence is sound and that it really supports 
a belief sufficiently to warrant it as probable. It is , manifes 
that we must see equally clearly the evidence for and against 
all of the alternative positions that we in any given case con-
\ sider relevant. We conclude, then, that clarity is ess ,ential 
to knowledge that has the warrant of probability. 
(4) an Objection to the abov~nal!sis. The analysis pre-
sented above, it may be objected, is all right as far a:s it 
goes, but it leaves out something important and thus is an over-
I simplification of the nature of knowledge. It fails to conside. 
whether or not there may be vagueness as to what constitutes 
the exact limit of warrant for a belief or of reasonable doubt 
about a belief. There is .frequently a factitious clarity be-
cause the warrant is supposed to be sufficient, when it is not. 
It may even be that we can never gain clarity as to exactly 
==-.Ji when any belief is really well-groun~~~~-~r when reasonable 
45 
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· t·f· d 34 doubt ceases to be JUS 1 1e • 
In this objection we find a slightly different use o[ the 
terms clarity and vagueness than those defined in Chaptl r I. 
They refer here to perception of the weight of evidencel 
Clarity, in this sense, would mean: manifest to the min~ or 
judgment, evident, plain. And it would refer not to thk mean-
ing of our ideas but to the manner in which we perceive the 
weight of evidence. While, then, the meaning of the terms is 
I 
1
1 
different from that which we are directly concerned wit~ , it 
I will be close enough to our present study to comment upon 
the above objection. 
There may be clarity of meaning in our beliefs as well as 
I their grounds without knowledge. For the grounds may not be 
sufficient, or they may be specious. But, to apply the terms 
clarity and vagueness to our manner of perceiving weight of 
evidence, if we do not perceive clearly that the warrani _for 
a belief is sufficient to make it a case of knowledge, {here 
is nothing gained by claiming that we have knowledge. J e do 
. I 
not have to say that we possess knowledge about a matteJ at 
all. In fact, there are many instances in which the only 
righteousness of the mind is to suspend judgment. If t Aere is 
vagueness, hesitancy, doubt about the weight of evidenc J in 
support of a belief, what is the advantage of call~ng t J at 
I 
34. This is closel:y related to ~arl Groos's. formul(a ofi ) :I 
"theo1"etical rela ti V1Sm and practlcal absolutlsm." Cf. Art .1 
1 
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I 
belief knowledge? As Turner has suggested, "Knowledg~ and 
35 I doubt can never come to terms." A belief may or miy not 
be knowledge, and until we can determine clearly whetller or 
I 
not it is well-gro~nded, all that we can do -is to look for 
I 
I 
further and more decisive evidence. 
§Rmffiary. Clarity is essential to knowledge. It is es-
sential to knowledge with the warrant of certainty anl to 
knowledge with the warrant of probability. 
knowledge we require to apprehend clearly 
the ~Eounds for holding it as knowledge. 
regard to these two aspects of knowledge, 
claim knowledge of anything. 
35. KBC, 3. 
In regard to all 
what is known and 
Without clat ity in 
we cannot j Lstly 
I 
-·- 1 
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CHAPTER III 
FURTHER REASONS FOR THE EMPHASIS ON CLARITY 
AS ESSENTIAL TO KNOWLEDGE 
Introduction. The object of this chapter is to examine 
other considerations than those presented above that lend 
I 
I 
I 
weight to the position that clarity is essential to kn9wledge. i 
More particularly, the following reasons which may be urged 
in support of that position demand our attention herez 1 (1) The ! 
I 
needless amount of disagreement among philosophers calls for 
an emphasis on clarity as essential to knowledge; (2) cl~rity 
I 
I 
I II (3) the view that clarity is essential to knowledge has had I 
in knowledge is required for intelligible communication; 
a no table success in mathematics; ( 4) that view has al,so been 
successfully adopted as regards scientific knowledge; and (5) 
that position has been tried with success by those ph~los-
1 
ophers who have made unmistakable additions to human knowl-
edge. 
I 
I
I 
·while the argument of the preceding chapter may be 1more 1 
fundamental and conclusive than any of these, a position, 
to be thoroughly tested, must be approached from various 
I 
standpoints. If the above considerations lend further support ! 
I 
II 
il 
I 
I 
to the view that clarity is essential to knowledge, we 1snall 
I 
be the more fully justified in our conclusion of the last 
chapter. 
(1) The Needless Amount of Disagreement~ng Philosopher& 
Calls for an EmPhasis on Clarity~_Essential to Knowledge. 
I 
In discussing this subject we wish to do two things: (~) to 
present a graphic account of the extent and tragedy of the 
I 
chronic disagreement among philosophers of the past and 
present; and (b) to show that if the needed unanimity regard-
! ing the most pressing problems for humanity is to be gained, 
I 
clarity is essential. 
(a) Nothing is more evident to a man who has mingled with 
I 
others and discussed with them questions concerning da~ly af-
fairs or more abstract subjects, than the numerous difterences 
. I 
of opinion that are entertained upon nearly every topib. In 
view of such differences in beliefs, the person who takes it 
• I 
upon himself to think even a little will beg1n to look for a 
reliable method of distinguishing the true from the fa1se. 
Upon entering the threshold . of philosophy we may feel as-
1 
sured that the sphere of conflicting opinions has in large 
I 
measure been left behind and that at last we can breathe a 
fresher air. For within the walls of philosophy there are 
I 
true ideas, and hence there must be agreement at least as 
regards solutions of the major problems. I But unfortunately 
this is far from being the case. Philosophy too is con-
taminated with differences of opinion so marked that a new-
' 
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comer could not but feel shocked and disappointed. The fact 
that there has always been and at present is so much disagree-
ment among philosophers even about the most elementary t nd 
fundamental matters, is decisive evidence of failure ana of 
I the need of sounder views of method and of knowledge than 
those frequently adopted. 
Descartes saw this as few philosophers have seen it. He 
says, for instance: 
Je ne diray rien de la Philosophie, sinon que, 
voyant qu'elle a est~cultiu{e par les plus ex-
cellens esprits qui ayent vescu depuis plusieurs 
siecles, & que neanmoins il ne s'y trou ue encore 
aucune chose dont on ne dispute, & par consequent 
qui ne soit douteuse, je n'auois point ass~s de 
presomption pour esperer d'y rencontrer mieux que 
les autres •••• 1 
Hume joins Descartes in deploring the state of philosophy when 
he declares: 
There is nothing which is not the subject of de-
bate, and in which men of learning are not of con-
trary opinions. The most trivial question escapes 
not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are 
not able to give any certain decision. Disputes a~e 
multiplied, as if ever~thing was uncertain; and th~se 
disputes are managed with2 the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. I 
The charge that philosophy is the art of "endlessly dis-
puting without coming to any conclusion"; or worse stil l , that 
I 
1. OEuvE~' VI, 8. Cf. ib., 6, and especially 16. 
2. Treatise, Intra., 305-306. Cf. ib., Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sec. 3, 
pp. 508-510. Cf. Locke, ~~l' Intra., Sec. 2, p. 27. 
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it is the "§.YS tema tische [s_icJ Jv1isbrauQ.h.Ls is] eine~e~ zu 
£ies~wecke erfundenen Terminologie.~." 3 is far from baseless. 
C. s. Peirce and w. H. Sheldon have also commented upon
1
the 
disagreement among philosophers in a manner worthy of notice 
I 
here. The former speaks of the present condition of philosophy 
as infantile because "earnest and industrious students of it 
are able to come to agreement upon scarce a single princi-
ple •••• " 4 Sheldon declares that "there is no stock of 1 funded 
truth in philosophy." 5 He insists that metaphysical dis-
putants have not a realizing sense of the thoroughgoing 1 dis-
sension among tbemselves, and that such a state of affairs 
". t 1 t d. . t . t . bl " 6 1s no mere y as oun 1ng; 1 1s err1 e. 
I 
He continues: 
I 
In fine, what is the situation? After a history 1 . 
of almost unexampled length, philosophy has less 1 
of positive information and more of controversy to
1 
show, than any other human discipline. Soaring to 
the greatest heights, it falls below the level of 1 
common knowledge; philosophers are not even sure 
that there is an external world. Religious quar-
rels, intenser though they may be, are not so mani-
fold ar so mutually undermining •••• Badly off in- 1 
deed we are: man's best endeavour to solve the 1 
chief problem of his life has been frustrated. 7 
No wonder we find Santayana saying, "Philosophy has been long 
I 
enough an asylum for enthusiasts. It is time for it to be- . 
3. Q_uoted in James, SPP, 9. Cf. ib.' 23. 
4. CPP, v, 342. Cf. ib.' VI, 11. See also ib.' v, 15'7. I 
5. sos, 26. 
6. Loc. cit. 
7. Ib., 34-35. 
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come less solemn and more serious." 8 
~5 . 
There a pressing need for unanimity 
A 
garding the most important problems of 
among philosophers re-
I 
philosophy that concern 
I 
humanity and its fortunes. Of course nobody wants unanimity 
for its own sake. Philosophy requires true conclusions above 
I 
all else, and the kind of agreement needed is that in which 
I 
philosophers reach and unite in affirming true oeliefs : ab6ut 
the most vital philosophical problems. For example, agreement 
is desperately needed concerning what men have a right ~ to 
I 
believe, what they may reasonably hope for, what they ought and 
I 
ought not to do, what ends they should place uppermost, whether 
or not the human adventure toward perfection 
whether or not the universe is a vast cosmic 
is worthw:tiile, 
I 
m.achine p: ~ indly'~ 
. I . 
producing new creatures and mercilessly grinding them to bits, 
etc. 
It may be urged that we may always expect disagreement, 
I 
and that disagreement is a useful thing. This is undoubtedly 
I 
true as long as we cannot as yet reach any decisive conclusion 
I 
but disagreement ceases to serve us when decisive conclusions 
I 
are within reach. There is no value in the mere fact of dis-
agreement, except that it spurs us on toward something : de-
cisive, shows us that somebody is in error, or that thbre is 
I 
a failure somewhere in the process of communication. 
8. cous, 164. 
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(b) The problem of t h is chronic disagreement among philos-
1 
ophers does not admit of any solution without clarity. 1 Of 
course, clarity is not all that is needed, but if the pbsition 
that clarity is essential to knowledge were taken seriously 
I 
it would contr~bute effectively to the required solutior• For 
one source of the disagreement is ·vague and unmanageabl1e ideas 
and an accompanying vagueness in language. Descartes s 1aw this 
I 
when he declared that some writers surround clear and evident 
ideas with ambiguities, and when he said, "Long~ facili_.us est 
de gualibeLg_uaestione aliguig_su§J2.ic§:.ri.J.. gu~m in vn~ quantum-
vis facilei ad ipsammet veritate~erveni~." 9 Locke saw 
it when he declared: 
Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and 
abuse of language, have so long passed for mys-
teries of science; and hard and missapplied words ~ 
with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, 
1 
such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and 
height of speculation, that it will not be easy to 
persuade either those who speak or those who hear 
them, that they are but rsvers of ignorance, and 
hindrance to knowledge. I 
Confusion and ambiguity are other sources of the disag~eement 
among philosophers. In short, vagueness, confusion, and am-
biguity have been fertile sources of the overwhelming amount 
of disagreement among philosophers. And there seems to be 
9. OEuvres, X, 366. Cf. ib •• 366-367 
10. ~~say, Intro., Sec. 2, p. 27. 
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little reasonable hope for an increase in unanimity among 
I 
philosophers, even in the most fundamental subjects, without 
I 
due emphasis upon the view that clarity is essential to cogency 
I 
of argument and hence to all that philosophers have a r~ght 
to call knowledge, that is, to all well-grounded belief. 
I 
Just as Descartes was driven by the appalling differences 
among philosophers (together with the inconclusiveness of their 
I 
arguments) toward clarity as a requirement of knowledge, so 
I 
~ust it be with us unless we are willing to accept a state of 
what promises to be unending disagreement among philosophers 
of the present and future. 
We may conclude this section by urging that '-f" l.t. the view that 
I 
clarity is essential to knowledge were a dopted by a large 
I 
number of philosophers, the amount of needless and tragic dis-
' agreement among them would be noticeably diminished. And that 
is a weighty consideration in favor of the view in ques 1tion. 
Moreover, if that position were widely adopted the remaining 
issues and differences would at least stand out far more 
I 
plainly than they now do. This would enable us to see both 
I 
what the issues are and what proposed solutions are the most 
promising. That too is a consideration lending weight 1to the 
view that clarity is essential to knowledge. For it is some-
1 
t h ing in favor of a position that, if taken seriously, 1it 
would tend to dissolve useless disagreements among philosophers 
and to bring the remaining issues out more sharply thari before. 
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munication. One who reasons with great care about philosophi-
cal problems and who at the same time sees that our most cau-
l 
1 tious reasonings are undertaken for the purpose of serving 
humanity, must be interested in more than possessing knowledge 
I 
for himself. He recognizes that knowledge is not merel~ some-
thing to be gained for its own sake, but that it must b~ com-
municated and made effective in the human world. For knowledge 
I 
is a means which makes possible certain ends. Philosophical 
I 
knowledge, like all knowledge, has an end to serve; that end 
I 
is the well-being of mankind. If that end is to be served 
I 
the knowledge must be coa~unicable. Furthermore, intelligible 
I 
communication is necessary if philosophers are to learn lfrom 
one another and in this way approach more decisive solutions 
I 
of philosophical problems. It is, then, something against 
any philosopher that his ideas are not easily communicable be-
cause of vagueness, or confusion, or ambiguity. 
While we might suppose that philosophers have no serious 
I 
difficulty in understanding each other, this is far from being 
I 
the case. One illustration (out of many that might be given) 
I 
will be sufficient to show this. Bertrand Russell, F. c. s. 
I 
Schiller, and H. H. Joachim took part in a symposium in Mind 
for October 1920, on the "Meaning of 'Meaning'." Schiller 
afterwards writes about that symposium as containing 
the usual features of a philosophic discussion. 
That is to say, it reads like a triangular duel, 
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in which each participant aims at something dif-
ferent, and, according to the other, misses it, 
and hits a phantom. li 
Schiller adds that Russell expresses himself 11 in difficult 
I 
and appa r ently contradictory terms, as philosophers so olten 
do •••• " 12 I 
s uch "duels" between philosophers, as we have a.lreadYi seen, 
a re far too numerous. "You haven't got wha t I mean," "That I 
is a different question from the one I am considering," 111 But 
I cannot see just wherein we differ"--these are familiar com-
I 
ment s which suggest, among other things, difficulties iri com-
munication. 
Vfhy is intelligible communication so ·difficult to .:tes.lize _; a;-
mongphilosophers? 1.J{hy is it not achieved more often th~n it 
is? In part because the meaning of ideas or concepts, and as 
I 
a consequence the meaning of wordst is vague, or ambiguous, or 
I 
confused. Such ideas cannot easily be communicated because 
in communication what one person has in mind must be seen by 
I 
another mind. If an idea, for example, is apprehended only 
I 
vaguely, hesitatingly, with mi s givings, plainly the problem 
of communicating it is made nearly insoluble. It is eq¥ally 
manifest that ambiguity and confusion in our ideas,whichar.e ,botl: 
I 
ma de possible by vagueness, make intelligible communication im-
I possible. I Thus intelligible communication requires that we 
11. Art. 1, 185. 
12. Lac. cit. On the relation between clarity and communi-
cation see Chapman and Henle, FOL, 131, 267, 270-271. 
56 
--
57 
--- -- --------------·- ------------------·---- ------------------------- ------ ·-
- ---------- - . --1-t-------
apprehend clearly what we intend by our ideas so that another 
mind can lay hold upon their precise meaning. It is therefore 
something important in favor of the position that clarity is 
essential to knowledge that, if it is taken seriously, it 
greatly improves the chances of intelligible communication. 
On good grounds it might even be asserted that there is 1no 
intelligible communication without clarity as regards the 
meaning of our ideas. 
( 3) The View t)!a t Clarity_ is Essential to Know! edge J!.as Had II 
§_Notable sue~ in_MatheW-tics. The purpose here is to show 
that the position that clarity is essential to knowledge has 
I 
been accepted and put into practice in the science of mathe-
matics with astonishing success; and that this success is a 
consideration that lends weight to that position (for without 
clarity mathematics would be impossible). 
I 
When Descartes was confronted with the overshadowing 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II I I I spectacle of disagreement among philosophers there is np-
:1 
II 
I 
I 
.I 
wonder that he turned to mathematics for light. He saw that 
I 
mathematics succeeded and tlmt philosophy did not. One1 of his 
I 
teachers, Father Clavius, had probably made this plain to him, 
I 
for we find these words in the teacher's M&thematical_Works: 
I 
The mathematical disciplines demonstrate and justify by the most solid reasons everything they 1 
may call for discussion, so that they truly beget 1 
science in, and completely drive out all doubts 
from, the mind of the student. 13 
------------------
13. ~uoted in Gilson, UPE, 130. 
--==-===== =::--=--==--==--...:...._ ________ ----------
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II He adds that this is not the case with other sciences, I 
where most of the time the intellect remains hesitat-
ing and dubious about the truth value of the con-
clusions, so manifold are the opinions and so con-
flicting the judgments. 14 
!I 
Descartes, in referring to his own various studies, tells us 
that of them all he was most delighted with mathematics be-
cause of its certainty and because of the evidence of its 
reasonings. 15 He says that he got from that science the clue 
to his method. 16 His emphasis on clarity was suggest,ed by 
the clarity exhibited in mathematics. 17 
we are here concerned with the service of clarity to the 
success of mathematics. As Descartes kmrYT, · ~ the.ma tics is 
one science which must see its way before it can take a step. 1 \ 
It demands clarity in the meaning of its terms, and it re-
quires clarity as regards perception of the grounds for all of 
its conclusions. Mathematics assumes that we must have clear-
cut notions and it owes its success in large measure to its 
clarity. For unless we perceive just what we mean by the 
various figures and symbols we employ in mathematics it is 
14. ~uoted in Gilson, UPE, 130-131. 
15. OEuvres, VI, 7. Cf. ib., X, 364-366. 
I 
16. Ib., VI, 19. Cf. ib., 20-22, 36, and X, 369. See also 
Locke, ~~say, Bk. IV, Ch. xii, Sec. 7. 
17. Cf. OEuvres, VI, 19; and VIII, 16. 
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18. cf. ib., VI, 19; X, 374, 378-379. These references show ( 
unmistakably how Descartes worked for a method in philosophy I 
similar to that of mathematics; that is, he wanted a method ·ttbat 
regardS·'. clarity as essential.'·=='- ____ _ to~-~-=--
1 
I 
II 
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manifestly absurd to suppose that we can even have such a 
science. Moreover, unless we have a clear hold upon the ground 
I 
for the conclusions we reach, it is equally absurd to, imagine 
I 
that such a science is possible. 19 
The science of mathematics cannot tolerate vagueness~ con-
II 
,I fusion, ambiguity, and disagreement. 
I 
Its success is attribut-
This ' fact 
I 
able in large measure to its emphasis on clarity. 
is a consideration which demonstrates that clarity is at least 
an essential in mathematical knowledge. 
Here we wish 
to show (a) that clarity is an essential to scientific knowl-
edge, and (b) that the phenomenal success of scientific' method, 
which would have been impossible without clarity, is another 
substantial reason for affirming the view that clarity is 
essential to knowledge. We would have a devastating argument 
I 
against that view if it (when taken seriously and applied) did 
I 
not prove to be workable. The point here is that the position 
in question, when adopted, has succeeded in the sciences. 
(a) Clarity is essential to scientific knowledge. I We may 
19. The more recent discoveries in mathematics have
1
com-
plicated the science, but they do not alter the argument 
presented here. For example, mathematics might well be an 
empirica l science, as Bridgman suggests, without~fecting 
the above reasoning. (Cf. Bridgman, NPT, 51-52) 
I 
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see this best, by considering first some of the essential 
features of scientific method and then by sho~ing how ciarity 
that constitutea I is required throughout the entire process 
that method, including the knowledge gained thereby. 
, I 
donsider, I 
for instance, the natural sciences. 
Natural science is a process of exploring the external 
world. Its object and task is to find "order among the facts," 
and this search for order is carried on by observation and ex-
periment. 20 It provides us with knowledge of general tenden-
cies, or laws, and of relations particularly of a classifica-
tory nature. The entire process of gaining scientific· knowl-
edge is scientific method. 
There are in that process a number of stages as follows: 
li 
11 (i) a particular problem is considered for solution, (ii) hy-
lj 
I 
I 
potheses, or suggested explanations, are selected, (iii) these 
are tested by experiment an~or observation until some hypoth-
esis is verified, and (iv) generalizations, or laws, are 
f9rmulated. 21 
Clarity is required in each of these stages. We require to 
apprehend clearly what the problem to be investigated and 
solved is. If we do not grasp this clearly, we cannot deter-
-----------------
20. Cf. Cohen and Nagel, LSM, 199. See also Poincare, S~~ , 9 
As Cohen and Nagel assert, however, "The specific nature of 
this order will vary with the nature of the subject matter and 
the purpose of the inquiry." (LSM, 249) 
21. For detailed treatment of scientific method see: J'evons·, . II 
. POS . ,_; Ritchie, SM; Poincare, SAM; Mill, SOL; Cohen and Nagel, 
LSM; Dewey, LOG; Russell, KEW; etc. 
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mine what possible explanations are even relevant. We require 
a clear hold upon the hypotheses considered. For otherwise 
we cannot ascertain whether or not or to what extent they are 
relevant, nor could we determine without such clarity which 
of them, if any, is true or the more probable. We require to 
grasp just what the tests (experiments, observations) ·are 
before we can conclude that they are or are not sufficient to 
verify a hypothesis. As regards any final generalizations, 
or laws, we require in like manner to see clearly what they 
are and what the grounds for their validity are. Thus with-
out clarity scientific .method and scientific knowledge which 
is gained by that method are impossible. Clarity is, then, 
essential to such knowledge. 
(b) The phenomenal success of scientific method, which 
I 
would have been impossible without clarity, is a fur.ther con-
sideration in favor of the view that clarity is essential to 
knowledge. For scientific method has proven itself to be, 
wherever carefully employed, a reliable means of av9iding the 
infection of prejudice and baseless beliefs; and it ha~ be-
come, when properly used, a means of gaining an unmeasured 
amount of knowledge. Therefore we are warranted i~ concluding 
that scientific method, in so far as it is successful, shows 
that the position that clarity is essential to knowledge is 
successful also. And this is a consideration in favor of 
that position. 
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(5) Ihe Ylew that ClariiY-i2-Essential to Knowledge Has B~ 
Agopt~_ig_Eractice by ~hos~hi!osophers Who Have Maqe Un-
mistaka:blLAdditions t_o Human Knowledge. We might with sound 
warrant say that there have been no decisive additions t ·o knowl-
edge on the part of philosophers without clarity. There, have 
been systems which rose to prominence, had their day, and 
crumbled like the structures of ancient Pompeii with only parts 
able to remain standing. Without clarity no systems can be re-
garded as decisively true. Without clarity the building-mate-
rial cannot be put together so that the whole structure will 
be firm, for vague ideas and loose arguments go together. 
Whitehead suggests that the 
history of thought is largely concerned with the r ,ecords 
of clear-headed men insisting that they at last have 
discovered some clear, adequately expressed, induhi-
table truths. 22 
--------------------·---
22. Art. 1, 262. Among the clear-headed men we might 'include 
the following. Plato has some claim to mention here because of 
his emphasis on definitions. He says in a typical passage, "The 
speaker should define his several notions and so make his mean-
ing clear." (Phaedr., 265D) But there is good reason to place 
him also with~se who emphasize vagueness. (See below p.?O) 
Epicur~·s insisted upon clear thought and expression. (yf. EPI, 
21, 53, 81) The emphasis on clarity became prominent with 
Descartes. As Huxley suggests, this emphasis is one of the chief! 
marks of modern thought as distinguished from ancient and medi-
eval. (HUM, v, vii) Locke and Hume belong with Des:cartes among 
the most prominent spokesmen of clarity. Some of the more re-
cent philosophers who stress clarity are: C. s. Peirce • (cf. 
CPP, v, 248-271); the logical atomists (cf. Russell, KEw, 4, 33-
59; and Langer, PP, 52-53, 35-36, 101-102); neorealists (cf. 
Holt and others, NR, 10-19, 24-26); and logical positivists 
(cf. Carnap, PLS, 38; LSL, xiii; Schlick, Art. 1, 115; and Ayer, 
LTL, 44, 62). The point can hardly be too much stressed that 
it is, in view of the disagreements among clear-headed men, 
, manifest that they can be wrong-headed. 
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While the clear-headed have often been wrong-headed, no 
fundamental additions to human knowledge have been made by 
philosophers without clarity. Vague insights, notions, sug-
, 
gestions have undouetedly stimulated thought and in that : way 
contributed to the final attainment of knowledge. But the 
I 
knowledge itself has been clear. Consider a few examples. 
. d . . t 23 . Descartes's max1m, "Je pense, one J e su1s,' 1s an, un-
mistakable addition to knowledge and it is an instance of clear 
knowledge. The distinction between mind and body is an im-
portant addition to knowledge and it is a case of clear knowl-
edge. 24 The diatinction between one mind and other minds is 
\ another decisive example of clear knowledge. 25 The fact t
1
hat 
I 
all knowledge is private, that every belief is judged true or 
I 
false before the tribunal of private minds (and that there is 
no other or higher court of appeal) is what analysis proves, 
I 
and it is a case of clear knowledge. The list could be ,mul-
tiplied. 26 This is by no means to argue that everythi~g 
that is clear amounts to knowledge, but that all that amounts 
I 
to knowledge is clear. 
I 
Unclear beliefs, on the other hand, such as those of ' some 
23. OEuvres, VI, 32, 33. 
24. See below, p. 
25. See below, p. 
26. For further examples see Chapter VI. 
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soul substance, or of a vague "Unknowable," or of a Din~!! 
I 
~' or of a world of Idea s in a region remote and beyond 
the world of process, or beliefs to the effect that mind and 
body are merely different aspects of the same thing--the
1
se and 
' 
all like them cannot amount to knowledge because they cannot 
be proved in terms even of probability. 
Thus far we have considered 
I 
I 
the relation between vagueness and knowledge only indirectly. 
we have been led to conclude that clarity is essential to 
knowledge. But this conclusion cannot yet be accepted as final 
' 
until we examine in detail the .Position that knowledge is a 
mixture of clarity and vagueness, that vagueness characterizes 
I 
to some extent all of our knowledge. For it may be that some 
crucial points have been overlooked which would change the 
entire picture. Furthermore, it might be possible to hold that 
I 
I 
while clarity is essential to knowledge, it is not necessary 
for our knowledge to be wholly clear. In such a case the view 
that vagueness characterizes knowledge would be -able to ~ stand. 
I 
we require, therefore, a close examination of the position, 
which is represented chiefly by Vlliitehead, that vagueness 
characterizes to some extent all of our knowledge. 
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I CHAPTER IV 
I VAGUENESS AND KNOWLEDGE 
I 
Introduction. The purpose of this chapter is to statle the 
position that vagueness characterizes to some extent all of our 
knowledge, and to present the chief arguments which have been 
urged in its support. We are not here concerned with a critica 
estimate of that position. 1 
TNhitehead plays the central role here because among con-
temporary philosophers he has devoted special attention to the 
idea that vagueness characterizes all of our knowledge. Rus-
sell too has joined Whitehead in affirming that view so 'we in-
clude some of his most pointed utterances on the subject in 
this chapter. Whitehead traces his doctrine that vague~ess is 
a character of all knowledge back to Plato, chiefly to the 
I 
Timaeus. For this reason it seems fitting to bring that ancien 
figure on the scene for at least a secondary part. Moreover, 
I 
since it is by no means obvious that Plato emphasized vagueness, 
I 
we require to see what Whitehead has in mind in linking tha t 
I 
name to the doctrine in question. Most of the reasons for the 
idea that vagueness enters into knowledge , : . which. w·e present be-
1. See Chapter V remarks of a critical nature. 
/\ 
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low, have been gathered from the writings of Whitehead. 1 
(1) Th~dea that Vagyeness Characterizes all Knowledge. No-
body believes that knowledge is wholly vague. Russell and, 
I 
more especially, \Vhitehead affirm that vagueness characterizes 
to some extent all of our knowledge. Thus knowledge is spoken 
I 
of as a mixture of clarity and vagueness. Just what do they 
mean by this? We begin with Russell's statement. 
He declares that when we speak of knowledge as being vague 
I 
we ~re not thinking of knowing as an occurrence. Knowle,dge in 
this case is incapable 0 of being either vague or precise and 
I 
there is an end of it. "Vagueness in a cognitive occurrence," 
I 
he adds, "is a characteristic of its relation to that which is 
known •••• " 2 What Russell has in mind is perhaps best exp,ressed 
in the following citation from him: 
\Vhat is clear is that the knowledge that we can ob-
tain through our sensations is not as fine-grained 1 
as the stimuli to those sensations. We cannot see 
with the naked eye the difference between two glas i 
ses of water of which one is whole2ome while the 
other is full of typhoid bacilli. 
When we apply the microscope and see the difference between the 
I 
two glasses of water, he urges, then it is obvious that our 
former perception was vague. He concludes that "it is per-
i 
fectly ordinary facts of this kind that prove the vagueness of 
2. Art. 1, 85. Cf. Leibniz's ~octrine of minute perceptions. 
(Philos. Schriften, v, 46, 47) See particularly Russell, POL, 
156. Le~bn~z Sa.ys, "On~ dort jamais si profondement_g_~ 
n'ay~uelg_ue sentiment foible et confus •••• " (Philos. 
Schrift~n, · v, 47) 
------ . 
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most of our knowledge, and lead us to infer the vagueness of 
I 4 
all of it." The knowledge is vague because there is ~ot a 
one-one relation of the representing system to the represented 
system, but a one-many relation; 5 as would also be the case 
regarding a portrait, for example, which might represen~ any 
one of several men. 
' vVhitehead, far more than Russell, has insisted upon the doc-
trine that vagueness enters into all our knowledge. He holds 
that both~ we know and the ~roun£~ for knowing it are not 
I 
and cannot be wholly clear. He declares that all exper~ence, 
I 
nearly all concepts, all knowledge and systems of knowledge 
are a mixture of clarity and vagueness. None of these is free 
from vagueness. In order to see just what he means by ~peak­
ing of knowledge itself as characterized to some extent 1 by 
I 
vagueness, we need to consider how vagueness enters into or 
characterizes experience and, more particularly, concepts. 
There are, according to Whitehead, clear aspects of experi-
ence, but these are embedded in an environment of what is more 
or less vague. He says, for instance, 
Our experience is dominated by composite wholes, 
more or less clear in the focus, and more or less 
vague in the penumbra, and with the whole shading 
off into umbral darkness which is ignorance. But 
throughout the whole, alike in the focal regions, 
the penumbral regions, and the umbral regions, there 
4. Art. 1, 91. 
5. Ib. , 89. 
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is a baffling mixture of clarity and vagueness. 6 
This vagueness applies equally to ideas or concepts. 1 White-
head insists that we cannot define clearly many common notions 
in regard to the complexity of relationship required for their 
il l ustration in the real world. He states: "Even our more 
I 
familiar ideas, seemingly obvious, are infected with this in-
7 
curable vagueness." Clear divisions are not found amqng 
genera or among species. "There are," Whitehead says, '' no 
8 I 
clear divisions anywhere." VJhen therefore we make sharp di-
visions conceptually we are moving away from the facts of the 
g 
rea l world. The notions most charac t erized by vagueness 
are those which he speaks of as too general to be clear' and 
which are presupposed in the clear distinctions tha t we make. 
11 The necessities are invariable, and for that reason remain in 
the background of thought, dimly and vaguely." 10 Among these 
notions that are especially vague are, to mention but two ex-
amples, the notion of importance and that of matter-of-fact, 
or mere existence. 11 Whitehead suggests: 
6. Att~l; ~ 263-264. Cf. MOT, vii. See especially FOR, 62-63. 
7. AOI, 185. Cf. MOT, 1, 6. Whitehead elsewhere says,' "We are 
very vague as to the meanings of 1, and 2, and 3, and 5, and 
6." (Art. 1, 263) 
8. MOT, 21. 
9. Ib., 25. 
10. Ib., vii. Cf. Alexander, STD, I, 184. 
11. MOT, 9. 
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This vagueness is the despair of cultivated 
people. For the generality, when stated, is 
too obvious to be worth mentioning. And yet 
it is always there, just on the edge of con-
sciousness. 12 
Vagueness intrudes itself also into knowledge. "The notion 
of a Et>here of human knowledge," says Whitehead, 11 charac1terized 
by unalloyed truth is the pet delusion of dogmatists, whether 
they be theologians, scientists, or humanistic scholars." 13 
By an illustration which Whitehead used in his lectures we 
may see what he has in mind. A person driving on a much 
traveled road sees traffic lights. I He perceives the bright 
colors clearly and distinctly. On the surface there is merely 
the clear perception of lights. But the green light dqes not 
in the nature of the case say, "Go on1" Moreover, behind the 
Veil, as it were, is the vaguely apprehended sense of the im-
portance and value of traffic lights. For there is alo/ays a 
world of importance behind every item of experience which can 
be reduced to clarity. 1 4 This is no less true of our 1knowl-
edge. All clear knowledge is abstracted from an environment 
that is essential to it. From this account it is evident that 
Russell and Whitehead are affirming basically the same1 doc-
trine. 
Whitehead, however, ca-cries the point still further and 
I 
12. MOT, 6. 
13. Ib., 94. Cf. Jevons, POS, 197; and Peirce, CPP, v, 408. 
14. Class Notes, 11-12-1936. Cf. 12-3-1936. 
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urges tha t vagueness enters a lso into all systems of kndwledge. 
The natural sciences are systems which advance by abstraction. 
They always leave out something that i s both relevant and im-
1 
portant. He h olds t hat whenever we seek to stop at a finite 
system we find, under critical analysis, t ha t somehow or oth er 
the bottom has dropped out. The point is, as Whitehead 1 said 
in a lecture, "We never ca n get on without something behind 
the veil." 15 This is particularly true when we try to :bring 
into our systems moral, aesthetic, a nd religious ideas. One 
of his most striking statements concerning the way vagueness 
chara cterizes systems of knowledge is this: 
Plato and Hume illustrate tha t system is essential 
f or rational thought. But they also illustrate 
that the closed system is the death of living un-
derstanding. In their explanations they wander be-
yond all system. They thus illustrate in their o~ 
procedures that our primary insight is a mixture of 
clarity and vagueness. The finite focus of clarity 
fades into an environment of vagueness stretrhing 
into the darkness of what is merely beyond. 6 
1 
17 (2) Plato's Timaeus and the Idea of Vague_knowled~. 1 we 
shall understand Whitehead's doc .trine still better if we con-
sider one of its primary historical sources. Whitehead tra ces 
I 
h i s view of knowledge back to Plato. It is our purpose here to 
I 
see why Pla to' s name may be ass ocia ted with the idea tha t 
15. Class Notes, 11-12-193 6. 
16. MOT, 114. 
17. By the expression "vague knowledge" we simply mean knowl-
edge chara cterized by vagueness. We do not mean knowledge of 
vague annearances such as of a fo g or of a blurred nicture.etc. 
?0 
I 
vagueness characterizes knowledge, and in doing so to under-
stand more fully ?!hi tehead' s own utterances. 
Vfuitehead consi ders Plato's !i~~ a sort of loc~ [ 
I cla~sicus for the emphasis on vagueness in knowledge. IPlato 
I 
is among the few philosophers, he tells us, who have noit 
I 
tacitly assumed that the more fundamental factors of e~peri-
ence lend themselves for clear discrimination. 18 Whi~ehead 
said once in a lecture that Plato is important because "he is 
almost the last philosopher who quasi-explicitly 
notion of the flashes of insight in the midst of 
reali~ed the 
I 
I the es
1
s en-
1 
I 
tially vague." 19 Plato, he further 
20 
saying things that are vague; 
stated, is continuJ lly 
and gloried in being ~ 
I 
muddle-headed person, for he saw more than he could exJress.21 
He endeavoured to be ad~uate rather than clear. 
Whitehead observes also that in respect to speculat i ve 
notions Plato's dialogues lean definitely toward an inexact 
and "likely account," or toward mere suggestion. 22 TJat 
I 
gifted figure of ancient philosophy suggests important !notions, 
I 
------~--·-· -·---
18. AOI, 225. 
19. Class Notes, 12-10-36. Cf. FOR, 67. 
20. Class Notes, 10-3-36. 
21. Ib., 10-1-36. 
22. AOI, 135. 
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makes what use of them he can, and drops them when he can't 
do anything with them. 23 He did not strive for a system. As 
Whitehead put it in a lecture on one occasion, "It is difficul 
to find any indication tha t Plato had a clear system of' 
thought." 24 And in regard to the deeper subjects he r ,esorted 
to myths. 
When we turn to Plato's own utterances we find evidence to 
support Vfuitehead's remarks to the effect that Plato. belongs 
with those who hold that vagueness may characterize our 
kno wledge. In the Tima~, more than in any other of his 
dialogues, we find that aspect of his speculative thought 
which is colored with vagueness by his own brush. For ,ex-
ample, he there says, 
vfuerefore, Socrates, if in our treatment of a 
grea t host of matters regarding the Gods and the 
generation of the Universe we prove unable to 
give accounts that are always in all respects 
se lf-consistent and ~erfectly exact, be not 
thou surprised •••• 2 . 
Some of the chief notions in the Timaeus are far from 
------- I 
nicely clear. They are frequently large and rough in outline. 
I 
Consider, for instance, the Receptacle. This is the mother of 
becoming, "invisible and unshaped, all-receptive, and ,in some 
most perplexing and most baffling way partakes of the in-
23. Class Notes, 10-17-36. 
24. Ib., 10-6-36. 
25. Ti~., 29C. 
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t 11 . "bl 11 26 e 1g1 e •••• It is a causative factor and bears the 
title of 11 Errant Cause. 11 27 It has motion. 28 It is the 
I 
potency of matter. 29 In it there is indeterminate space and 
indeterminate time. 30 God works with it and the Pattern is 
embodied in it. It is the locus of creation, the primordial 
chaos. The notion of the Receptacle is that of essentially 
indeterminate brute fact. Ideas of this sort in the Ticiaeus 
I 
have led Vfuitehead to praise Plato for illustrating in his 
writings the view that in the larger topics vagueness is the 
best we may hope for. 
Plato is also known for his use of myth . With unusual 
felicity of expression Vfuitehead approves as follows of 1 the 
insight which prompted Plato to resort to myths: 
The father of European philosophy, in one of his 
many moods of thought, laid down the axiom that 
the deeper truths must be adumbrated by myths. 
Surely, the subsequent history of Western thought 
has amply justified his fleeting intuition. 31 
Plato's dialogues consist only mainly of argumentative conver-
t 
sation. They contain a lso a large number of myths. The 
26. Ti!!! ., 51:8. 
2 7. Ib. , 48B. 
28. Ib., 53A. 
29. Cf. ib., 52E. 
30. Demos, ~OP, 32-33~ -
31. MOT , 14. 
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element of myth in them is, according to Stewart, an organic 
part of the Platonic drama and is not merely incidental. ~ 32 
I Plato's philosophy cannot be fully understood without reference 
I 
I 
to it. If this view is correct, it might seem that Whitehead 
is all the more justified in linking Plato's name with his own 
view that vagueness is a character of our knowledge. 
Plato, it appears, felt unable to express some of his ' deeper 
notions satisfactorily without recourse to myth. In respect 
to this Stewart says, 
In the wide-awake life of conduct and science, 
Understanding, left to itself, claims to be the 
measure of truth; Sense, to be the criterion of 
good and bad. Transcendental Feeling, welling 
up from another 'Part of the soul,' whispers to 
Understanding and Sense that they are leaving 
out something. What? Nothin33 1ess than the secret plan of the Universe. 
In other words, for Plato, the Whole, or all-embracing Good, 
cannot be grasped by the senses or the understanding bu~ is 
seen only imperfectly in a vision and expressed in a simili-
tude. 34 It is not within the purpose of myths to bristle 
with clear, sharply discriminated ideas, but only to handle 
ideas imaginatively and in their broad general features. For 
this reason it is easy to see how the use of myth may be associ-
32. MOP, 1. The idea that myth constitutes a genuine ' part of 
Plato's philosophy will be argued below. (See pp. ?6- ?7) 
33. Ib., 42. Cf. !im., 71A-E. 
34. Cf. ib., 42, 59. 
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ated with vagueness. 35 
The Ti~~ once again attracts our attention because it 
seems to be an excellent example of Plato's use of myth to 
convey speculative ideas. This dialogue is obviously myth, 
36 / -
allegory, or symbol. It is a mythical discourse "fff:f l -rou 
I 
,. 37 
1T«V'iOS· But if, as Shorey maintainf?, the !i~us does nott 
represent what Plato really believed, but is merely a flight 
into the world of fancy, then Whitehead,. stands upon doubtful 
ground in tracing his emphasis upon vagueness back to ~lato. 
A good deal could be said by way of showing that Plato had 
keen interest in clear definitions and accurate discrimina~ . 
tions. Since Yihi tehead has linked his view of knowledge with 
Plato's Timaeus, and since he has suggested that we must look 
to Plato rather than to Descartes, Locke, and Hume : for our 
most penetrating insight into the nature of knowledge, we are 
here justified in ~xamining that dialogue more closely to 
determine whether or not it is a genuine expression of what 
Plato believed. 
Shorey tells us in reference to the Timaeus: 
we must not look to it for revelations of the 
inner meanings of Platonic philosophy. It is 
35. We shall see in Chapter VI that myth and clarity may 
very well supplement each other. See below, p. 141J- • I 
36. Cf. Shorey, WPS, 333. 
3 7 • T i~. , 2 7 C • 
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merely the grandest of those literary digres-
sions which Plato allowed himself when he laid 
aside for a time the discussion of eternal re-
alities (methods of abstract reasoning) and en-
joyed a relaxation that brought in its train no 
repentance. 38 
This view is mistaken. To be sure, some of Plato's utterances 
in the !imaeus on mathematical proportions according to which 
the elements are mixed seem childish and anything but credible 
stuff. Nevertheless, there are difficulties with Shorey's 
position that seem to the writer insurmountable. 
:B,irst, that interpretation would imply that Plato is wanting 
in sincerity. Plato in no way suggests within the dialogue 
that he is merely indulging his fancy. On the contrary, the 
whole tone is that of serious inquiry. He insists, as though 
he really meant it, that since exactness and accuracy cannot 
be achieved in an adequate treatment of the nature of the uni-
' 
verse, we must content ourselves with the most likely account. 
' Second, and more important, the Ti~~ is in accord with 
Plato's later speculative ideas. This becomes plain when we 
consider, for instance, the relation between it and the 
Philebus (another of his later dialogues). 39 
38. WPS, 344. 
39. The Philebus, unlike the Timaeus, is not in the form of 
myth. It Is just the opposite. The argument is straightfor-
ward and cold by contrast with the Timaeus. The Philebus con-
tains Plat~'s mature ideas on ethics and is predominantly 
ethical in nature. But it also contains some highly signifi-
cant metaphysical portions in which Plato treats the four funda-
mental classes of Being. (cr. Phileb., 23D, 26E) The two 
dialogues have many verbal resemblances. According to both, 
the universe has a rational Maker. The notion of the soul as 
76 
I 
It seems, then, that on the whole Whitehead is justified in 
associating the doctrine that vagueness enters into knowledge 
with Plato's Timaeus. i But there is a qualification that must 
be made. Plato is there concerned with the nature of the uni-
I 
verse, and while he appears to allow a place for knowled~e 
tha t is in a sense vague, we could not from a study of that 
dialogue conclude that he adopts the position that vaguepess 
characterizes all knowledge. The chief point about Platb--and 
the one Whitehead would most emphasize--is that he saw more 
I 
than he could clearly formulate and he sought adequacy above 
I 
clarity. 
connected with the body, and the theory that our souls and 
bodies are made of the same elements as those in the universe--
these ideas find expression in both. (Cf. Phileb., 30A, and 
Tim., 30B) Several scholars have pointed, --rnaddi tion, 'to an 
1ncomparably more significant relation between the two dia-
logues, namely the analogy between the four classes of Being in 
the Philebus and the fundamental notions of the Timaeus. (Cf. 
Bury, POP, xlviii-xlix; Demos, POP, 7-1~ - : ; Burnet, EGP~ 332) 
The Demiurgos of the Timaeus fills out the same idea as the 
Primal Cause of the Philebus. (Cf. Tim., 28C-29A, 41AB, 147E; 
and Phileb., 26E, 27A, 30ACD) The Pattern or Model corres~onds 
to the class called the Limit. (Cf. Tim., 27D-29A, 30C, 31A, 
38A, 39DE, 48E, 52A, 53B; and Phileb:-,-27D, 25A; see also 
Demos, Art. 1, 564, 567) The Receptacle and the Unlimited seem 
to play similar roles in the respective dialogues. (Cf. Tim., 
48B, 51B, 52E, 53A; and Phileb., 24A-25A) Finally, the 1 Be~ 
coming or Copy of the Timaeus corresponds to the Mixed Class 
of the Philebus. (Cf. Tim., 31B-32C, 35AB, 36B, 37A, 50CD; and 
Phileb.~:26AD)- --- 1 
-orcourse, exact blending or melting of these several notio 
into each other is not to be expected, but careful stud~ shows 
that the Timaeus contains in greatly extended and elaborated 
form the essential metaphysical concepts of the Philebus. The 
latter differs from the former in being condense~and in that 
it is not in the form of ~yth. We are warranted ~n concluding, 
then, tha t the Timaeus, though having the form of myth, is in 
substance a genuineexpression of Plato's thought aboutl the 
universe. 
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We turn next to the primary reasons for the idea that vague-
ness characterizes all knowledge. These, for the most part, 
have been gathered from the writings of Vfuitehead. 
(3) Chief Reasons for the Position that y~ueness Cha~ter­
izes Knowledge. The primary ground for this doctrine may be 
expressed as follows. We require to understand the world of 
process as it actually is. Clear knowledge, by its very na-
ture, can snatch for us only abstracted bits and tiny bundles 
of facts out of a vague environment in which they live and move 
I 
and have their being. These facts are so bound up with their 
environment and their environment with them that to abstract 
them, as clear knowledge requires, is to distort them and thus 
I 
to lose, in large measure, the concrete world. Clarity there-
fore, while useful in its way, breaks down and is not the 
I 
proper medium for gaining an adequate account of the na~ure 
of things. The points taken up below are elaborations of this 
basic argument. 
(a) Vagueness eharacterizes thLEmpiriQ.e:LGrounds_Qf 1 Kno,~l­
~dge. Whitehead's chief objection to almost all epistemolo-
gies of the past two centuries is that that which is clear 
in experience is viewed as trustworthy, and that which is 
vague untrustworthy. There is thus danger of putting out of 
I 
sight the more fundamental and habitual sides of experience. 40 
40. Class Notes, 10-8-36. Cf. AOI, 225; FOR, 27, 39, 41, 43, 
62- 63, 67, '71-72; SMW, 64; MOT, vii; and Art. 1, 263-264. 
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He speaks of how "thinkers repudiate our intimate vague ex-
periences in favour of a mere play of distinct sensations, 
I 
coupled with a fable about underlying reality." 41 
In other words, the clear aspects of experience ar~ se-
lected as the surest basis upon which to build our knowledge. 
I 
But this is not warranted. In the first place, such a pro-
1 
cedure grounds our knowledge upon superficial aspects of ex-
1 
' 
-- 1--· 
perience only and issues in a brand of knowledge that is arti-
ficial and merely scims the surface. Secondly, the deeper as-
, 
pects of experience are always there and we cannot get rid of 
them merely by abstracting from them what is clear. "T4e 
basis of experience is emotional." 42 
element cannot be reduced to clarity. 
And this emotional 
I 
Yet, it enters into 
and colors all that we strive to make clear and all that we 
I 
select, because of its clarity, as the basis of our knowledge. 
-· 
Thirdly, the data with which we must in fact begin are ~n a 
"radically untidy" condition. 43 No sciences can legitimately 
start merely from clear and distinct elements and develop by 
a clear process of elaboration. 44whitehead speaks of "that 
crude evidence on which philosophy should base its discus:= ~.:.: 
45 
sion •••• 
41. MOT, 43. Cf. FOR, 62-63. 
42. AOI, 226. Cf. FOR, 63. 
43. Cf. OT, 109. See Dewey, EAN, 32. 
44. ~hi9 is · or course a direct attack upon Descartes. 
45. AOI, 291. 
--
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Scientists have persistently failed to see the true nafture 
of the data with which they have to work, and have for t~ t 
I 
reason been able to gain clarity. This failure, according to 
I 
I Whitehead, is due to the "influence of language, moulded 1by 
science, which foists on us exact concepts as though the~ 
461 represented the immediate deliverances of experience." 1 we 
must conclude, then, that since the empirical grounds of !our 
. I 
knowledge are characterized by an inevitable vagueness, the 
I 
I 
knowledge itself cannot be free from vagueness. I 
I 
(b) I~eeper Aspects of Reality Lie beyond the R~h of 
Cla rity. Whitehead says that the pitfall of philosophy Js ex-
clusive concentration on the "manageable relationships t d the 
I 
neglect of the underlying necessities of nature." 47 
Numerous scientists and philosophers have believed thj t 
clear ideas alone are the media whereby we may grasp the lna-
ture of reality. They have carefully pushed aside the deeper, 
I 
more permanent factors and ideas, and excluded everything which 
I 
cannot be made clear. This is not warranted. For clear 1 ideas 
I 
I 
are so fenced in and limited in their sphere of applicat~onthat 
I 
they can reach only the more superficial aspects of reality. 
Ma thematics and logic, for example, assume that we cab have 
I 
clear-cut notions. But it is vital to realize that thesf 
notions cannot go very deep. They always seem to slip a~ay 
46. OT, 110. Cf. SWN , 64-65. 
47. MOT, 43. 
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when carefully looked at and applied to the real world. White-
head said repeatedly in lectures that what is clear in ex-
. t . t . . l . t t 48 1s ence ls no pr1mar1 y 1mpor an • To illustrate this 
general idea, he once called attention to the table at which 
he was seated. How obvious it is, he said, that the table is 
I 
the same as it was before. But actually it has lost a few 
molecules and gained a few; and hence, it isn't quite the 
I 
same. Here is an instance of what it costs to use concepts 
that are wholly clear. We simply lose basic features of the 
49 flowing world of existence. 
"The price of not being in a muddle,'' Whitehead suggested 
in a lecture, "is tha t you omit those elements in your experi-
50 
ence which you cannot systematize." If we still insist 
that our thought is both completely clear and applicable to 
reality "we merely delude ourselves," to put it in Bowne's 
words, "with a false show of accuracy, while the facts re-
' 51 
main as vague as ever." 
I 
\Vhitehead urges this idea, that clear concepts touch only 
the surface, as the main thesis of his Modes of Thought1 when 
he states: 
48. Class Notes, 12-3-36. 
49. Cf. ib., 10-6-36. 
50. Ib., 10-13-36. 
51. TTK, 186. Cf. ib., 202, 224, 308; and THE, 41-42. 
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The doctrine dominating these lectures is that 
factors in our experience are 'clear and distinct' 
in proportion to t heir variability, provided that 
they sustain the ms elves for that moderate period 
required for importance. The necessities are in-
variable, and for that reason remain in the back-
ground of thought, dimly and vaguely, Thus phil- I 
osophic truth is to be sought in the presupposi-
tions of language rather than in its express 
s t a tements. 52 
(c) The_Togetherness of Things. Thinkers of the past two 
I 
centuries have frequently proceeded without taking seri Jusly 
I 
I 
the crucial fact of the togetherness of all things. Clarity 
may be achieved if we studiously make light of or ignor~ this 
I 
I fact, but not otherwise. The reason for this is that clarity 
I 
is gained by selecting and abstracting t h ings from their 
I vironment with which they are essentially bound up. I 
I 
The doctrine of the togetherness of things, though n6t 
en-
original with 1Nh i tehead, is a ca rdinal principle in his I or-
1 
ganicism. Not all of the philosophers who have shared ~his 
doctrine with him, however, have found in it a basis for the 
I 
I 
breakdown of clarity and the intrusion of vagueness intp 
knowledge. Hegel, for example, gave the famous 
Wahre ist das Ganze. ·· 53 But he did not regard 
I 
dictum, I 
that as l a 
I 
ground for considering partial approaches to truth vagu~, 
though of course they are in his view incomplete. I 
Bradley comes close to affirming \Vhitehead's positio~ 
I 
52. MOT, vii. Cf. ib., 1. 
53. PG, 5. 
our 
Das 
that 
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when we turn to the interrelations between things vagueness 
is inevitable. The similarity between the views of these two 
men in this respect is so striking that a few specific bita-
tions from the former may even serve as an introduction to 
I • Whitehead's utterances. Bradley condemns the whole relat1onal 
I 
type of thought, which, as he says, is a "practical compromise 
most necessary, but in the end most indefensible." 54 We 
I 
succeed, he declares further, "merely by shutting the eye, 
which if left open would condemn us •••• " For we turn our 
backs on the aspect we 3:~ire to ignore and move on. 551 In 
truth, however, the subject of all judgment is, according to 
56 Bradley, "reality as a whole." He applies this mode of 
thought to our observations as follows: 
\Vherever a truth depends, as we say, upon ob-
servation, clearly in this case you cannot tell 
how much is left out, and what you have not ob-
served may be, for all you know, the larger part 
of the matter. 57 
Philosophy, to sum up Bradley's ideas on this subject, will 
I 
always be hard, "and what it promises even in the end is no 
I 
clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision." 58 
54. AAR, 33. 
55. Loc. cit. 
56. Cf. ETR, 32, 4ln; and POL, II, 626. 
5 7 • AAR, 53 9 • 
58. ETR, 106. For utterances of other philosophers who 
stress this idea of the togetherness of things see Royce, WI, 
II, 24-25, and SRI, 137; Alexander, STD, I, 23; and Bowne, 
TTK, 237-238. 
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I 
Turning to Whitehead's thought on the togetherness of 
I things, we may begin with a simple illustration • . Suppo::;;e we 
I 
are thinking of a human mind, of what we call its body, land of 
I 
an orange which that body has just fed on. If we view each 
I 
of these three objects as sharply separated from each other a 
not essentially what they are in virtue of their interrela-
tions, we may gain clarity in our discussion of those o~jects, 
But when we consider how consciousness dims off until it is 
I 
not sharply distinguishable from mere bodily feeling, ~~ ·-· and 
. I 
I 
when we ask just when it is that the orange becomes part of 
I 
the body and ceases to be orange, then we find an inevitable 
I 
vagueness appearing on the scene. To achieve clarity we must 
I 
indulge in illicit abstraction and be content with supe~fici-
ality. Whitehead states: 11 Abstraction from connectedneds in-
1 
volves the omission of an essential factor in the fact con-
sidered. No fact is merely itself. 11 60 And what we omi t is 
I 
vague, but none the less intimately bound up with what we 
have made to appear clear. All of this rests upon Whit Jhead's 
doctrine of the essential togetherness of things. I 
I 
Each event, he holds, extends beyond itself across other 
events of which it is a part. 61 "An event in passing be-
l 
59. Cf. MOT, 218-223. 
60. Ib., 13. 
61. PNK, 61. Cf. especially ib., 4. 
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comes part of l a rger events •••• " 62 I Whitehead declares also, 
"How an actual entity becomes constitutes what t hat actual 
63 
entity is." The citations could be multiplied. I t is the 
fundamental doctrine here before us that provides in part the 
I 
basis for Whitehead's utterance in a lecture that "there is no 
such thing as a finite truth , though owing to an assumption of 
an essential decency of things some finite truth is for us pos-
sible.n 64 Owing to the togetherness of all things, moreover, 
there never was an accurate observation. 65 Something relevant 
I 
is always left out. 
The point is, by way of summary, that whatever is beyond our 
clear ideas, beyond clear knowledge, beyond clear systems, is 
I 
vitally interrelated with them and hence we are faced wVth an 
inevita-ble intrusion of vagueness into all that we clear
1
ly dis-
criminate. The clear is gained only by enforced abstraction. 
(d) Inclusiveness .above All Else. Clarity, then, whi:ch of 
course has its uses, betrays us in our efforts to understand 
reality. For it succeeds only by being superficial and 1 by 
violent abstraction . 'rheref or e that whole emphasis is defec-
tive. 
62 . P:NK, 62. 
63. PAR, 34. 
64. Class Notes, 12-3-36. 
6b. FOR, 67. 
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I Bergson, he suggested in a lecture, is only partly right 
I 
in ho l ding t hat the intellect in reasoning distorts the ~orld. 
He should have gone further, says Whitehead, and defined! dis-
tortion as due also to the fact that we start with a fin!i te set 
of data. Limitation distorts our interpretation. The ~iffi­
cul ty lies primarily in the arbitrary limitation which c:on-
I 
sciousness provides. What we thus dis tort s tands in ref1erenc e 
I 
to a presupposed background. 66 We require, therefore, above 
all else an ~dequate account of things. 
The sciences, because of their abstract character, . h~ve be-
. I 
come superficial. 67 They have confined themselves to ~hat 
can be clarified and neatly organized to the neglect of /the 
more basic notions without which they themselves cannot llay 
hold upon the world of events. Vlhitehead urges, "The c 6ncrete 
world has slipped through the meshes of the scientific Aet. 1168 
I 
Why? Because they have sought clarity and tidiness to the 
neglect of inclusiveness. Fortunately, the natural scibntists 
I 
manage to save themselves by assuming and presupposing meta-
physical notions. 69 But these notions are vague from f he 
I 
66. Class Notes, 11-28-36. Whitehead goes so far as 1~ o say 
that 11 in the study of ideas, it is necessary to remembe!r that 
insistence on hard-headed clarity issues from sentiment~l 
feeling, as it were a mist cloaking the perplesities of[ fact •••• 
Our reasonings grasp at straws for premises and float o:n gos-
samers for deduction." (AOI, 91) I 
I 
67. MOT, 41. 
68. Ib., 25. 
69. Cf. FOR, 44-48. 
--
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point of view of their clear systems. 
Philosophy has also made the same error of concentrating 
upon clear ideas and relations. In this it has been le~ far 
astray. The clear ideas which Descartes, Locke, and Hume urged 
as primary in philosophy, are assigned by Whitehead only sec-
70 
ondary roles. Philosophy must deal with the necessities and 
large general notions which "are inherent in literature, in 
social organization, in the effort towards understanding physi-
?1 
cal occurrence." These notions cannot be analyzed into 
terms or factors more far-reaching than themselves and do not 
admit of the neat clarity which Descartes and others have 
sought. 
In metaphysics each sentence should include the necessities 
I 
of all things which constitute the unity of the universe. This 
is evident from the preceding remarks on the togetherness of 
all t h ings. We must include all phases of existence. White-
head spoke of this in a lecture somewhat as follows: "N,ow if 
you forget this you gain clarity but lose metaphysics., For in 
metaphysics we are concerned with the essential necessities of 
all existence." 72 Clarity must therefore give way in order to 
make room for an adequate interpretation of reality. We re-
quire above all else to strive for inclusiveness in order to 
70. Cf. MOT, 43-44. 
71. Ib., 1. 
72. Class Notes, 11-28-36. 
I[ 
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understand reality as it concretely is. 
(e) MZsticism. The idea that vagueness characterizes knowl-
edge, or at least that it characterizes some of our knowledge, 
may be traced also to mysticism. There is some rational force 
in what the mystic has to offer on this subject. 
Mysticism, in one sense, is direct or immediate conscious-
ness of God. In the philosophical sense, however, it is , a 
method of knowing. It is the theory that we can attain knowl-
edge, particularly of the ultimate nature of reality, on1ly by 
a supra-rational and supra-sensuous means; in short, by intui-
73 
tion or spiritual insight. Usually the mystical intuition 
I 
is of the Oneness and otherworldliness of the ultimate real-
•t 74 1 y. There are three essentials in philosophical mysticism: 
First, knowledge is gained by intuition which is supra-rational; 
second, this knowledge is ineffable though we may make attempts 
to express it; and third, this knowledge of what is called the 
Oneness and otherworldliness of ultimate :reality is a higher 
a nd profounder order of knowledge than any other. 
The Ennead~ of Plotinus are a locus classicus for mysticism 
in philosophy. Plotinus shows all the essentials of the mys-
tic · and he was a primary source of inspiration to later , mystic 
By referring to his notion of the One we may readily seb how 
I 
'73. Cf. James, VRE, 371. 
74. Cf. Montague, WOK, 54. 
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I 
vagueness may be viewed as a character of our mystical knowl-
edge. 
In much of h is reasoning Plotinus follows Plato by proceed-
ing from the region of change and becoming to that of the age-
less and unailing reality. But his dialectic carries him even 
further than did Plato's. It does not stop until it reaches 
the One. It rests, Plotinus says, 
instructed and satisfied as to the Being in that 
sphere, it is no longer busy about many thingss 
it has arrived at Unity and it contemplates: it 
leaves to another science all that coil of premis-
s es and conclusions called the art of rea7gning, 
much as it leaves the art of writing •••• 
Plotinus opposes strongly the view that knowledge is "a mass 
of theorems and an accumulation of propositions •••• " 76 The 
One is beyond the reach of these. It is not to be thought of 
as one in relation to two. 77 It is beyond existence. 78 It 
is infinite in the sense that it is free from limitations, and 
it is f a r above all other orders of reality, though not 
wholly unrelated to them. Properly s peaking, though negativ e 
statements may be made about the One, it· is ineffable, for a s 
Plotinus puts it, "Thus the One is in truth beyond all state-
ment." 79 From the standpoint of the "coil of premisses and 
-- --
?5. ;§~ds, 1.3.4. 
?6. Ib., 5.8.4. 
??. Ib., 5.5.4; 6.9.5-6. 
?8. Ib., 1.?.1; 5.4.12; 6.8.16. 
?9. Ib., 5.3.13. 
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conclusions," the One is undoubtedly a vague notion. And yet 
the One is claimed as an object of knowledge. Our knowledge 
' gained by means of reasoning cannot reach the One, but by in-
tuition knowledge of the One is possible. 
In writing on this subject William James states: "Vague im-
pressions of something indefinable have no place in the ration-
l . t" t " 80 a 1s 1c sys em •••• He adds that that part of mental life 
of which rationalism can give an account is relatively super-
f ; c 1· al. 81 ·It has th t · f b · t h • e pr~~~' o course, ecause 1 as 
loquacity, for 
it can challenge you for proofs, and chop logic, 
and put you down with words. But it will fail to 
convince you all the same, if your dumb intuitions 
1 
are opposed to its conclusions. 82 
Mysticism, then, claims that clarity is a medium unsuited 
i to the apprehension of what is most real. It is another ap-
II 
I 
I 
proach to arguments presented above; and if its affirmation is 
true, that much more weight is placed upon the scales in .favor 
of the idea that vagueness may characterize at least our 
more important knowledge. 
2~ary. We have seen that Russell and Whitehead affirm 
that vagueness characterizes to some extent all of our knowl-
edge. This doctrine is traced by Whitehead to Plato's Timaeus 
80. VRE, 72. 
81. Loc. cit. 
82. Loc. cit. 
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with some justification. For Pl~to there illustrates by his 
procedure the idea that our deeper notions must be treated by 
reference to myth. The chief reasons for the position that 
vagueness characterizes knowledge are these: (1) Vagueness 
characterizes the empirical grounds of our knowledge; (2) the 
deeper aspects of reality elude clarity; (3} the togetherness 
of things requires us to dismiss the idea of a ~. brand - of · knowl-
edge that is wholly clear as unable to catch for us the con-
crete world; (4) inclusiveness is required above all else; and 
(5) the claims of mysticism to a knowledge which,though not 
clear from the standpoint of reason, is none the less knowl-
edge. 
These arguments must be examined with special care, for if 
they are able to stand up under critical analysis some of the 
central and apparently most conclusive arguments of Chapters 
II and III will require drastic revision. Moreover, we wish 
here to determine whether or not Whitehead's position possesses 
the perfection of being true. It is the task of the next 
chapter to present a critical analysis and evaluation of the 
primary .argumeryts ·. fo:r the view tha. t knowledge is or can be 
characterized by vagueness. 
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CHAPTER V 
CRITIQ.liE OF THE IDEA THAT VAGUENESS 
CHARACTERIZES KNO\~DGE 
Introducti~. The purpose of this chapter is to determine 
whether or not knowledge can in any respect be characterized 
by vagueness. We pursue this topic by presenting a critical 
analysis of the chief arguments (as .§l et forth in the preceding 
chapter) for the idea that vagueness is or can be a character 
of knowledge. Following this analysis we consider several 
objections to that position. These latter we . need not here 
mention in detail since we are now sufficiently prepared to 
expect them and since they are easily recognizable when we 
come to them. 
Before turning to the critical analysis of the arguments 
presented in Chapter IV, however, the central problem of this 
chapter must be made more explicit. Two points in particular 
need to be mentioned at the outset. (a) We are not here 
questioning that there is such a thing as vagueness. No one 
would deny that vagueness is a term with a wide and useful 
region of application. (b) Moreover, we are not here inquiri-ng · 
---· 
-- r--
I 
I 
whether or not there can be knowledge of appearances that are 
in a sense vague. Beyond question there is knowledge of ap-
pearances that are characterized by sensory vagueness. These 
two points must be pursued a little further. 
(a) In Chapter I three kinds of vagueness were mentioned: 1 
I 
I 
sensory vagueness, verbal vagueness, and logical vaguene1ss. 
Sensory vagueness applies to all those appearances which lack 
I 
I definiteness, determinateness, sharply-defined and easily 
recognizable limits. Words are vague in so far as they icannot 
I 
be assigned exact and well-marked regions of applicability. 
Logical vagueness applies to the ~aning of our ideas. 
I 
I iAn idea 
I 
is vague when we do not apprehend exactly what we intenq by it 
and cannot even for ourselves specify its meaning. 
' Now vagueness, in all of these senses, has a definite !mean-
ing and the concept is entitled to a place in our thought. 
I 
Many ·_qf _qur 13Very<i~Y ".~pp~arances ~ are characterized by vdgue-
ness. Fogs, clouds, the normal awareness of our bodily state, 
i 
blurred pictures, hazy scenes of any kind--all of these~ in 
their appearance to us, are vague. It is a matter of cbmmon 
I 
' 
experience too that words are frequently used to which the 
I ppeaker or writer may not be able to assign any exact and well-
marked regions of applicability. such words as the fol}owing 
I 
are,u:p to certain points, vague: red, bald, square, lake, 
1. Vide supra, 17-20. 
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mountain, America, peace, war, regimentation, democracy, 
personalism, logical positivism, philosophy, etc. etc. 
1
Fur-
thermore, the meaning of many of our ideas, like that of our 
words,is vague. Probably a large majority of our opinions or 
beliefs are in some respects vague. Much that constitutes 
what Huxley speaks. of as "that common igno r ance which often 
passes for Common Sense" 2 is vague. About all this there 
can be no reasonable question. Vagueness has a wide and use-
ful meaning. Our problem in this chapter, then, is to :· deter-
mine- only whether or not vagueness can in any respect charac-
terize knowledge, whether or not so ·'much:.as :: the nose of the 
camel of vagueness can enter into knowledge. 
{b) There is a sense in which vagueness must be allowed in 
I 
knowledge. We can and do have knowledge of appearances that 
are characterized by ~nsorl vagueness. For instance, though 
the appearance of a fog is vague, we still have knowledge of 
that appearance. But it is crucial to notice in this case 
that only the appearance, not our meaning, is vague. For we 
apprehend clearly what we mean by an appearance which is 
characterized by sensory vagueness. It is evident, therefore, 
that in the present chapter we are not concerned with whether 
there is or can be such a thing as knowledge of appearances 
I 
that are in this sense vague. Beyond question · we have such 
knowledge. On the contrary, we are here considering whether 
2. MAR, 179. 
there can be such a thing as knowledge which is itself ~n any 
I 
• • I 
respect character1zed by log1cal vagueness. We must once a-
gain stress the fact that knowledge is a logical thing J nd 
hence the only sort of vagueness which can characterize lit is 
I 
I logical !~ueness. We are now prepared to begin the critical 
analysis of arguments presented in Chapter IV. I 
I 
(1) Bussell's Position ~futed. Russell says that v! gue-
1 
ness applies only to a representation. "A representatiJn is 
i vag~," he tells us, "when the relation of the representing 
I 
system to the represented system is not one-one, but one-
many." 3 By way of illustration, a photograph which is so 
blurred that it might represent any one of several persams is 
I 
vague. He continues, and we quote him at length, 
It may be said: How do you know that all knowledge [ 
is vague, and what does it matter if it is? The 
case which I took before, of two glasses of. water, 
one of which is wholesome while the other gives you 
typhoid, will illustrate both points. Without cal+ 
ling in the microscope, it is obvious that what you 
see of a man who is 200 yards away is vague com-
pared to what you see of a man who is 2 feet away; 
that is to say, many men who look quite different 
when seen close at hand look indistinguishable at 
a distance, while men who look different at a dis-
tance never look indistinguishable when seen close 
at hand. Therefore, according to the definition 
there is less vagueness about the appearance under 
the microscope. It is perfectly ordinary facts of 
this kind that prove the vagueness of most of our 
knowledge and lead us to infer the vagueness of 
all of it. 4 
3. Art. 1, 89. 
4. Ib., 90-91. 
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Russell says also that though knowledge is vague it need lnot 
I I 
be false, for "a vague belief has a much better chance of being i 
I I 
,I true than a precise one, because there are more possible facts ' 
that would verify it." 5 He suggests, for example, that we 
would come much nearer making a true statement if we sail, 
I 
"That man is tall," than if we declared, "He is 6 feet afd 2 
! 
I I inches in height." 
I 
i I 
Russell's statement is correct in everything except the con- lr I 
:I 1 . th t ( . h . I c us1on a vagueness even 1n 1s own sense of that term 
i' 
i I; which is ver.y.· ·close ,,.- to :' logical vagueness as defined in tfis 
I inquiry) characterizes knowledge. This conclusion does not fol-
1 
, low from any of his considerations. 
[I 
It is obviously tru~ that 
I 
:1 we cannot with the naked eye see the difference between two 
I 
I glasses of water, one of which is wholesome while the other con-I 
I 
I 
II 
tains typhoid bacilli. It is manifestly the case that two men 11 
I II 
, seen at a distance may not be recognizable though when they II 
come close we have not the slightest difficulty in recogbiz- 1
1
\ 
I 
:
1 
ing and distinguishing them. But from these facts we ca:b.not in-1
1
1 
I ' 
It i li !'
1 
fer that there is even the faintest vagueness in our knowledge. 11 
I 
' I • 
;' The fact is that our knowledge of the two glasses of water 1s 
•I I 
'
1
1
1 
incomplete, but what we know is clear. What we know cletrly \\ 
'r is that we are ignorant about some attributes of the wat~r. Also 1 
\i our knowledge of the men at a distance, while clear, is kimply 
,, 
i 
,, 
I 
J! 
I 
I' 
,, 
I 
I 
It 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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are close at hand. We may of course speak of as pee ts of any ,,, 
I I 
object that we know as lying in the region of our ignor~nce. ti 
I I, 
Our knowledge begins just where the ignorance ceases and there ·I 
I ,, 
is no reason for introducing the notion that vagueness 1harac- 11 
terizes the former. I 
Russell's argument that a vague belief has a better dhance 
of being true than a precise one because there are more lpos-
' I !I 
sible facts that would verify it, is equally defective. i When 1 
we say, 11 That man is tall, n it is obvious of course tha. i 1:,1e 11 
I I 
are on safer ground than when we say "He is 6 feet and 2 I 
I I'.' inches in height. 11 But in order for either statement to be 
I I; 
warranted as knowledge all of the terms in question must be I 
- I : 
free from vagueness. There must be a one-one relation between ,1 
. I ,I 
what we mean by "tall" and the height of the man in question. 
I 
Hence our knowledge in this case is not vague, though it is 
I I 
mathemat- ,I :I more general than knowledge which is expressed with I I 
ical accuracy. If we do not apprehend clearly what we mean 
II 
by "tall," we cannot claim with warrant that a man is tkll. 'I 
I
I I! 
It is thus evident that a vague belief, in so far as it is ,, 
vague cannot be verified. I I 
I I 
( 2) Ylhi tehead' s_MgQill§.nt§..J1efu ted. We have seen in :chapter : 
IV 6 that \Vhitehead's reasons for affirming that vagueness 
I 
characterizes all knowledge are as follows: (a) Vagueness 
characterizes the empirical grounds of our knowledge; 
' I 
(b) 
I 
I 
the li 
I 
----~~--~-~ Vide supra, 78-90. I 
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deeper aspects of reality elude clarity; (c) the togetherness 
I 
of things leads us to infer that what we make clear is g~ined 
I, I 
11 by abstraction which omits essential factors and thus loses I 
I, 
I 
' the concrete world; (d) we therefore must seek, as did Plato, 
I 
;j 
I 
inclusiveness above all else; and (e) the testimony of mYsti- I ,, 
,, 
cism demands a hearing. These we consider in the order pre-
sented above. 
(a) Vagueness may characterize much that appears in opr ex -
1 
perience, and that experience may be in the most untidy ,eondi- rl 
I 
tion, without our knowledge itself being characterized b~ I 
I II 
vagueness. That is, appearances may be vague in the ~~sor,x: 'i 
sense of the term without there being any vagueness whatever I 
I 
as regards the meaning of our ideas. II Knowledge is a logical 
I 
affair and however much the empirical grounds of knowleqge are 'I 
characterized by sensory vagueness, the knowledge itsel~ can- I 
1 'I 
not be regarded as vague unless the ~~~ of the terms, or 
I I 
our apprehension of the grounds, is vague. For this reason 
the above argument in favor of the idea that there is s J ch a 
I 
I 
I 
il thing as knowledge that is characterized by vagueness i ~ 
' baseless. 
' (b) The deeper aspects of reality, according to Whitehead, 
I 
elude clarity, and hence, clear knowledge (is there is such a 
I 
'I 
'I I. 
tlling) must be shut up to trivialities. There is in this argu- 11 
ment an important point. There is so much that we do n~t and II 
I' at the present time cannot know that a large amount of :what IJ 
i· 
' we may be said to know is superficial, trivial, insignificant. I! 
-
--·-··------------~-··--- ··---
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The meanest a nd most palpable things have their dark sides, 
so that as Locke put it, that part which we see of either the 
intellectual or sensible world 
holds no proportion with that we see not; and 
whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our 
thoughts of either of them is but a point, al-
most nothing in comparison of the rest. 7 
At the very best, to adopt Kant's figure, we gain but islands 
'I 
of clarity in the midst of an ocean of ignorance. All ,of this ' 
is true, but the real situation cannot be changed in the 
slightest by adopting the position that knowledge itself can 
be or is characterized by vagueness. 
Moreover, when we contemplate the deeper aspects of reality 
we find upon analysis that knowledge begins just where vague-
ness ceases and clarity is attained. An illustration will 
bring the point out. Suppose we bring to the stage once II 
!' 
again the table to which Vfuitehead referred in his lectures. 8 1 
One of the deeper aspects of the table is its interrelated-
ness with other objects such as the floor, the room, Harvard 
University, etc. etc. Our clear knowledge of the table, ac-
cording to Whitehead, misses much as regards its interrela-
tions. For instance, the table is constantly viewed as the 
same object that it was even though it may be moved about, 
even though it is always changing--and thus in slightly dif-
ferent relation to its environment--and even though we can 
7. ~~' Bk. IV, Pt. III, Sec. 23. 
8. Vide supra, 81. 
l1 
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never know exactly where (that is the exact point) the table 
ends and the floor begins. Now this illustration helps us to 
see that where vagueness begins knowledge ceases. For we see 
that while the table may be interrelated in va:tio.u.s · ·ways .'. wi t[l :-: 
numerous other things, and ultimately with the whole universe, 
it is evident that our knowledge does not reach further than 
those relations which we can clearly specify. While we may 
know that the table is distinct from the floor, what we do not 
know is the exact point at which the table ends and the floor 
begins. 
Furthermore, when it is suggested that knowledge of the 
deeper aspects of reality cannot be clear we may mean one(or 
both) of two things. We may mean that wha~ we know is only 
apprehended vaguely; or we may mean that our apprehension of 
the ~£9unds of that knowledge is vague. We have already 
I 
,, 
I 
I 
I 
I tl 
seen that if what we claim as knowledge is vague we cannot de-
termine whether or not it is knowledge; and that if the 
grounds are apprehended vaguely ,we cannot ascertain whether 
or not they are real grounds. 9 In view of previous discus-
sions of this we need not linger on it further. In Chapter 
VI, also, we treat this problem in considerable detail. 
(c) Does the fact of the togetherness of things warrant in 
any way the conclusion that knowledge can be characterized by 
1 
vagueness? Whitehead has made a great deal of the abstract 
I 
9. Cf. Chapter II • 
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I 
character of clear knowledge. He has insisted that because 
such knowledge is so abstract it cannot catch the world of re-
1 ality in all of its togetherness. 
Clarity, it is true, is gained by a process of abstraction, 
but from this we can neither disqualify it as essential to 
I II 
II 
!I 
'I 
I 
I' 
knowledge, nor justify in the least the position that all knowl-
'1 
edge is or can be characterized by vagueness. With Whitehead : 
II 
we agree in affirming that we must avoid mistaking abstractions 1 
I f t 1 . t . 10 B t t . th h . h h ,, or concre e rea 1 1es. u we canno . go w1 1m w en e 1 
insists that what we gain by abstraction distorts the actual I 
flowing world. If this were true, our clear knowledge would 
not really be knowledge at all. For knowledge cannot be valid 
1 when it d·tstorts the very thing of which it is supposed to be 
I. 
a true representation. 
Knowledge, ' as defined in this inquiry, is gained by ab-
stracting for a special purpose and it is in consequence ab-
stract in nature. No thought of any kind can advance without 
abstracting, selecting items for a special purpose out of a 
II 
larger whole in which they have their setting. Whitehead him- I 1 I, 
self says that we must think within limitations and proceed 
by violent abstraction. 11 Our knowledge, then, like o~r 
thought, cannot escape the fate of being abstract. But just 
what can be inferred from this fact? 
10 • SWN, 81 • C f • i b • , 7 4. 
11. MOT, 121. Cf. ib., 13-14, 21. 
;I 
II 
!I 
;J 
I 
,I 
'I 
I 
101 
- -L1=---==--=.:=--=====-....::~====--:=- =-:.=--=--=-~-=-..:.--=-==::. _____ ___ ! -----
I 
--r~--- ----------
II 
,, 
.. -- -·----------- - --
we cannot infer from it that clarity distorts the real 
world, for the fact that knowledge is clear and abstract has 
nothing to do with whether or not it holds good for that aspect '' 
of reality which alone it claims to portray accurately. More-
'I 
over, we cannot infer from it that clear knowledge is unsuited 
to represent for us those aspects which it claims to represent. 
The primary basis for the view that clear knowledge, being 
abstract, fails to catch for us the flowing world and even 
distorts it is the belief that we cannot gain a valid account 
of fragments or aspects of reality, but can only possess real 
knowledge of the whole of reality, of things in their together-
ness. If, however, we take this belief seriously we must 
abandon all hope for knowledge of any kind. For we cannot at 
one and the same time entertain in our minds knowledge of all 
the aspects of reality in all their interrelations. Unless 
therefore our knowledge of fragments or aspects of reality 
yields a valid account of them, so far as it goes, we simply 
close the door to knowledge altogether, and philosophy might 
just as well shut up shop. Fortunately, nobody who expounds 
, this theory accepts it in practice. In any case, we need not 
be led to jump to the conclusion that our knowledge of frag-
ments distorts or misses reality;because, once more, the fact 
that our clear knowledge is abstract does not imply that that 
knowledge distorts or loses those concrete aspects for which 
alone it claims validity. 
I 
I 
'I 
'i 
'I 
.I II 
Furthermore, we cannot infer from the fact that clear knowl- o~ 
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edge is abstract that we must take refuge in the position that 
knowledge is in some respects characterized by vagueness. 
nothing is implied which would lend the slightest weight to 
that doctrine. 
The utmost that can be inferred is that the knowledge in 
question is only partial and fragmentary. Nobody in his right 
mind would deny this. We have already seen that knowledge of 
aspects of reality in no way implies distortion of reality and 
that in so far as the aBpects are distorted or are apprehended 
vaguely we do not have knowledge at all. There is no more 
reason for denying the validity of our knowledge of aspects 
of reality (abstract though it is) than there is for throwing 
away a piece of a jig-saw puzzle because it is not the whole 
thing. 
11 The illuminating distinction to be made here is between 
legitimate and illegitimate abstraction. In the latter we dis-
tort the face of reality by shutting out considerations that 
are essential to a proper understanding of a topic or of an 
aspect of reality. In the former we consider all that seems 
to us relevant for the purposes that we have in mind. Any 
condemnation of abstraction is a condemnation of thought 
. lf 12 1tse • 
(d) We must seek inclusiveness, according to Whitehead, 
above clarity. Hegel has shown with remarkable ingenuity and 
12. Cf. Lewis, MWO, 55. 
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I cogency that we must endeavor to be as inclusive as we 
We must strive, of course, for knowledge that gives us the most 
adequate account of reality possible. But if our so-called in-
elusive and adequate knowledge is logically vague, and there-
fore not rationally verifiable, what have we gained? The out-
/. 
come is poetry and not philosophy. It may even be excellent 
poetry. But philosophy demands a sort of knowledge which ad-
mits of verification. Vague beliefs, vague knowledge (if there 1 1 
is such a thing), are such that in so far as they are vague 
;I 
we cannot apply to them the law of contradiction, and for this 
reason we cannot verify them. If therefore any so-called in-
elusive or adequate knowledge is to have philosophical value, 
it must be clear as well as adequate to the purposes in hand •. 
From the standpoint of philosophy, inclusiveness at the price 
of cogency cannot be tolerated; and clarity is essential to 
cogency. 
(e) Mysticism testifies to a kind of knowledge that is 
characterized by vagueness. That is, this knowledge is vague 
from the standpoint of discursive thought. It is not difficult 
to see how such knowledge might be viewed as characterized by 
I 
I 
I 
II 
,, 
I 
vagueness. Suppose, for instance, we pbs~ess knowledge lof the 
11 
existence of God. He is still so far beyond us, so vast, so 
I 
powerful, so mysterious that we might readily feel that what 
we know of God is partly clear and partly vague. 
About this two things must be said. First, though we may 
know that something which we call God exists, we may still : . . . ·. 
I 
'I 
II 
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I• 
entertain many vague ideas about him. But this of course in 
no way requires us to hold that these vague ideas amount to 
knowledge, even though they have to do with an object of our 
knowledge, namely God. In this case, we must separate what we 
know, namely that God existst from what we cannot regard as 
knowledge, namely, vague and hence unverifiable ideas about 
God. 
The second point is this. We may know clearly that there 
is much about God that we do not know. Whitehead has said, 
"There is always a vague 'beyond,' waiting for penetration in 
respect to its detail." 13 We may know that there is this vague;' 
beyond, we may know that our ignorance about God is like the 
seven seas in size as compared with the single drop of our 
present knowledge about him. But this would in no way imply 
before the tribunal of reason and be judged. If it is found 
to be warranted, it stands; if and in so far as it is found 
wanting, it must fall. And in so far as it can even admit 
of verification, it must be clear. 
I 
il 
I 
I 
I 
There are further objections to the position that vagueness :! 
___ , __ _ 
13. MOT, 8. 
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can characterize knowledge which demand our attention . 
these we now turn. 
To 
i 
i ( 3) K!lQ}!±.,edgSL_CannQ1.JlLan:y Degree be Vagge wi.t_hogt C~§.sigg 
I 
,: 
'I 
I 
I; 
I, 
I, 
I to be Knowled~. If we suppose that knowledge is logically 
vague t.o. any ext_!:lnt ·~ we may mean that vagueness characterizes 
I 
what we know, or we may mean that our apprehension of the 
I 
~round~ of knowledge somewhat vague, or we may mean both, of 
I 
,I 
1 these. , 'I Whitehead holds that both what we know and the grounds 
1
, for knowing it are always to some extent vague. Let us view !I 
these in detail. 
I 
What do we mean when we say that the what or content ,of 
knowledge is somewhat vague? We may mean that our I knowl'edge 
' I 
I 
I 
I 
put ft 
! 
1 is only general in nature and not detailed; or, to I I 
,I differently, we may mean that there are aspects of what we " 
I I 
know that are obscure to us. For example, suppose we know that
1 
I 
the Munich Agreement took place some time during the year 1938 
.I 
:I 
! 
1
1 
but do not apprehend clearly the month or week or exact date. 
/. 
Such knowledge might be called to some extent vague. But the jl 
truth of the matter is that what we actually know in this case 
is not vague at all. Though our knowledge here falls within 
wide limits, in the sense that it does not specify the par-
I 
,, 
,, 
I 
I 
I 
ticular month or week or day, it is none the less clear! ,as 
far as it goes, namely about 1938. It only happens that we 
I, 
do not know as much as would rather easily be accessible to us \ 
by studying back numbers of news·papers. Here vagueness is en- ,, 
I 
tirely outside of the knowledge that we have. And this is pre-\ 
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cisely the case in every instance as regards the content of our I· 
' knowledge. 
we may, however, carry the point a little further. Someone 
!!light urge that what we know has a tinge of vagueness in it 
because the terms of our knowledge are always characterized by 
vagueness. He might go on to say -: that knowledge is always the 
result of a relating activity. It is a relation between. two 
or more ideas which holds good. Vagueness, then, may be, viewed 
as coloring one or all of the terms involved. For instance, a 
person may believe with sound warrant that the world has the 
form of a sphere. There are two terms here, namely the world 
and a sphere. It may be argued that neither of them is per-
'' fectly clear but that both are somewhat vague. But, in so far 
.,. 
as either(or bot~ is vague, we cannot call our belief well-
grounded, for we cannot in such a case determine whether or not 
the relation holds good; in short, we cannot then know that 
the world (whatever that might be) is a sphere (whatever that 
might be) • From the above arguments we conclude that vague-
, ness is in no respect, and cannot be, a ch~ract~r of the con-
tent of knowledge. 
1fuat do we mean when we say that there is an element of 
vagueness in our ~pp~rehension of the grounds of knowle~ge? We 
may mean that we do not grasp precisely what they are, that 
is, that they are to us unspecified and indeterminate; or we 
may mean that there is much about them which is to us obscure. 
In respect to the latter, it is manifest that we cannot base 
I 
any knowledge upon grounds which are to us obscure, even i 
though we may have reason to believe that those grounds are 
I 
there and awaiting penetration. As regards the former, :qamely, 
that we do _not apprehend exactly what the grounds are, i1; is 
equally obvious that in so far as our hold upon them is ~ague 
i 
we cannot claim knowledge. For just in so far as we grasp 
I 
them vaguely we are unable to determine whether or not they 
I 
are real g~ounds. 
It might be urged, however, that there are many cases
1
of 
I 
' knowledge in which we do not apprehend the grounds clearly 
I but only within certain broad limits. But in this case, I we 
I 
would have to know exactly what the grounds included even 
I 
i 
though they were broad in their scope. Here again, then, we 
I 
I 
could justly claim knowledge only in so far as we had a 
I 
clear grasp of the grounds, whatever they might happen to 
be. Of course, the moment we perceive that the grounds of 
our knowledge are broad in extent, we also understand that 
the knowledge in question is only of that sort which can1 
be based legitimately upon such grounds. For example, it 
I 
may be a well-grounded belief that the 
of Boston is lower than that of Miami. 
I 
average tempera tu're 
I 
I • The grounds for thJ.s 
i 
knowledge need not be elaborate in detail, nor need they be 
I 
I • • 
mathematically formulated. For the belief is not one requrrJ.ng 
such minute evidence. But that belief cannot rightly be 
viewed as knowledge unless we perceive its grounds clearly. For 
otherwise we cannot ascertain whether or not they are sufficiern 
to warrant the belief. The fact that these grounds are not as 
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I 
as fine-grained and detailed as would be attainable does not 
in the least keep them from being apprehended clearly. we 
conclude, then, that vagueness does not and cannot in the leas t I 
degree cha racterize our apprehension of the grounds of our 
kno wledge. 
(4) The Doctri~that Knowle~is to Some Extent Logically 
y~ue Makes no Positive Contribution to Philoso~. Even 
though this doctrine were true it would not help in the solu-
tion of any problems. \qbat purpose is it designed to serve? 
It is intended to open the way to a· type of knowledge which 
includes within its scope the larger and deeper aspects of 
reality such as interrelations between things and the facts 
of the world of feeling. 
But we have already seen that if s o much as the nose of 
the camel of vagueness is allowed into :the tent of knowledge, 
what we' call . k~owledge is not in fact knowl'edge at all. 14 It 
may be interesting, it may be poetic, it may be suggestive, 
it may have all manner of excellent attributes. But i ·t cannot , 
be well-grounded belief. Thus it is manifest that the ad-
vantage claimed by the doctrine in question is not a positive 
contribution to philosophy at all. 
( 5) There are Definite and InsuJ2emble_Difficul ties..t¢tending, '; 
!he Position that Vagueqess Can Characterize Knowledge. Among 
14. Vide supra, 104. 
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the more prominent of these difficulties are the following: 
The doctrine in question encourages an easy contentment I (a) 
'I with vague ideas and with makeshifts for arguments; (b) it 
I 
1\ 
I 
blurs the line tha t marks off philosophy from the baseless and 1 
drifting opinions of mankind; · - (c) were such a view of 
knowledge accepted, it would become a fertile source of con-
f u$ion in our thought; and (d) it would also be a source of 
I 
ambiguity. Each of the s e requires elaboration. 
(a) Philosophy has been long cursed with vague undigested 
'I ideas a.nd with makeshifts for arguments. The failure to per-
s ist to the bitter end in t h e analysis of ideas and in the 
pursuit of decisive arguments is a tragic chapter in the 
history of philosophy. This failure is tragic, and as in-
tolerable as it is trag ic, because the very core of philo sophy 
is cogency of argument. Without tha t we have no philosophy. 
Vague ideas vitiate the whole process of close and deci s ive 
'i 
'I 
'I I, 
reasoning because unless we appreh end clearly wha t premi,ses 
I 
we have in mind and wha t conclusions we draw from them, nothing 1 
follows from the processes we may go through. 
Philosophy, then, cannot tolerate vague ideas a nd make-
" ' 
shifts for arguments. But the doctrine that vagueness in-
evitably characterizes to some extent all of our knowledge 
tends to sanctify an easy contentment with vague unmanageable 
II 
II 
ideas and indecisive arguments. How does it do this? First, 
, by encouraging us to believe that we have reached bottom in I' 
our analysis of ideas when we have not. Fo r if complete clar-
110 
ity in our ideas is neither expected nor required, we will 
stop our search before we have succeeded in clarifying those 
ideas. Second, contentment with vague ideas and indecisive 
arguments is sanctioned by the doctrine in question because 
it insists, so to speak, that we stop looking for clear~drawn 
distinctions and principles. Inclusiveness and adequacy come 
before clarity. It is foolish to strive for clarity because 
we only gain a superficial brand of knowledge when we do so. 
We must cease expecting philosophy to give us a clear theory 
of reality. So the argument runs. 
But refusal to gain clear distinctions and principles is 
simply to push aside the very substance of philosophy, namely 
cogency of argument. Any condemnation of philosophy for clear 
ideas, clear distinctions, clear theories, is simply a con-
damnation of philosophy for being philosophy, for there can be 
no cogency of argument without clarity in our distinctions and 
in our hold upon the ideas we are treating. 
Further still, the position that vagueness is an element of 
kno wledge opens the way to an easy contentment with vague ideas 
and indecisive arguments because it tends to encourage us to 
seek security behind the veil of obscurity. Hume saw the foree 
of this point when he said: 
'Tis easy to see, why philosophers are so fond of 
this . notion of some spiritual and refined percep-
tions; since by that means they cover many of their 
absurdities, and may refuse to submit to the de-
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cisions of clear ideas, by appealing to such as 
I are obscure and uncertain. 15 I 
" I 
II 
We have, then, in the above considerations further reason for 
rejecting the doctrine in question. 
I 
(b) Another difficulty accompanying this doctrine is that 
blurs the line that marks off philosophy from the baseless 
i t 1 
opinions of mankind. It whittles down the fence separating 
/I philosophy from that 'chaos of conflicting prejudices called 
1 public opinion.' The difference between the two is made to 
1 be merely one of degree. Philosophy cannot tolerate this, for 
I 
!1 the very first principle of philosophy is that its conclusions 
1 must be valid, well-founded, solidly based. 
Just how does the view that vagueness is a character of 
I knowledge blur the distinction between philosophy and the 
I, 
, drifting opinions of mankind? It does this by providing room 
within knowledge for ideas, which like many of those that 
I 
are cherished without thought as to their validity, are vague. 1 
It also does this by making light of closely-knit arguments 
and clear conclusions. In this way philosophy is turned into 
a kind of unsettled system of opinions which is noteworthy 
15. Treat., Bk. I, Pt. III, Sec. 1, Vol. I, 3?5. Descartes 
tells us in his Re~lae (Rule V) that it is much easier to 
have some vague notlonabout any subject than to reach the 
real truth about a single question, however simple that may 
1 be. (Of. OEuvres, X, 366) Hume, it may be added, is really 
defending vague sensa against clear ideas. 
·I 
'! 
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chiefly because it is adequate,or inclusive, and stimulat-
1 
,, 
ing. 16 This is a consequence of a doctrine which allows 
vagueness to characterize knowledge. 
(c) If the view of knovrledge that is here in question were '1 
accepted it would become a fertile source of confusion in our 
t hought. Suppose we are discussing the terms "pragmatism" 
1 and "utilitarianism" but do not know exactly what we mean 
by them respectively. We could, in such a case, very easily 
confuse the two, or in other words, outline one upon the other. ' 
But when we have a clear grasp of these two ideas, we see that ' 
they are distinct and hence there is no danger of our confusing ' 
them. Philosophy can ill afford to allow standing-room, even, ~~ 
within her walls to a doctrine which tends beyond question to 
increase the amount of confusion in our ideas. Confusion is 
' already too much with us. 
Let us turn to two typical cases of confusion, found in 
writings on philosophy, which result in part at least from 
vagueness. The first cencerns the mind-body problem, and 
the second has to do with the relation between one mind and 
other minds. (i) G. F. Stout provides us with our first 
example. In discussing the mind-body problem he declares: 
The supposed contrast between merely bodily 
process a nd merely mental is in fact always, in 
part, a contrast between the body as external ob-
---- -~------
16. Cf. Whitehead's remark tha t 11 it is more important that a 
proposition be interesting than that it be true." (AOI, 313) 
From the standpoint of philosophy, however, it is most impor-
tant that an idea be both true and interesting. 
ject and the same body as internal object •••• 
As it actually takes place mental process is 
also bodily; mental action is also bodily action, 
and mental passivity bodily passivity •••• Men- 17 tal occurrences are ••• bodily and mental in one. 
stout is not a lone in affirming such a position. It may 
seem that we solve the mind-body problem by simply saying that 
the t wo a re different aspec~s of the same thing. But the prob-
lem continues untouched. "Even if heads be weak," as White-
1 head says in an entirely different context, "the problem re-
mains ." 18 It remains because we have no clue whereby we can 
determine what is meant by calling the mental bodily and the 
bodily mental. We may apprehend clearly what we mean by mind 
and mental . We may grasp clearly what we mean by body and 
bodily • . But when we read the words, "Mental occurrences are ••• 
1 bodily and mental in one," we find ourselves in a predicament 
like tha t of a man who ha s fallen ·overboard and is struggling 
for something substantial on which to lay his hands. We cannot 
find any determinate meaning in the above statement. The two 
ideas, mind and body, mental and bodily, are separable in 
thought. Without the slightest difficulty we can think of a 
body carrying on its regula r course without mental life being 
present at all. (It is of course true that there are slight 
-----
17. ~~' 308-311 • . Whitehead adheres to a similar doctrine, 
for he says, 11 \rvh.ile we exist, body and soul are inescapable 
elements in our being, each with the full reality of our own 
immediate self ." (MOT, 220-221. Cf. ib., 218-223) 
18. FOR, 13. 
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physiological differences between the body when it is accom-
1 panied by consciousness and the body when it is not accompanied 
, by consciousness.) In dreamless.·. sleep . . the body is there but 
I 
I 
the mind is not. This constitutes no difficulty because we can 
think of body without in the least implying or thinking of mind. 
Moreover, we can think of mind without the faintest hint of a 
reference ·to bOdy. Therefore these two terms are distinct, are 
separable in thought. Thus far all is clear. But the moment 
the mental is mixed with the bodily, forthwith we begin to 
grope. For t wo distinct ideas are outlined one upon the other. 
This is a typical instance of how vagueness may further 
and encourage confusion (not of course that vagueness is solely 
responsible). For if we have a clear idea of mind and a clear 
idea of body, we immediately perceive that while minds and 
bodies may be intimately related to one another they cannot be 
identified with one another nor be made to overlap upon each 
other. It is only when our ideas are vague that such confusion 
is possible. 
Confusion of this sort is a serious problem in philosophy. 
It i s a n example of how thought can be retarded and even pushed 
backwards for hundreds of years. For in this case two ideas 
are forced to grow together which Augustine, as early as the 
beginning of the fifth century, showed to be distinct. Long 
before the time of Descartes, he said: 
When the mind knows itself, it knows its own sub-
stance; and when it is certain about itself, it is 
certain about its own substance. But it is certain 
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about itself ••• ; although it is not at all certain 
whether itself is air, or fire, or some body, or 
some function of body. Therefore it is not any of 
these. And to that whole which is bidden to know 
itself, belongs this, that it is certain that it is 
not any of those things of which it is uncertain, 
and is certain thaf9 it is that only, which only it is certain it is. 
Once more, then, philosophy cannot afford to harbor a doctrine 
which in any respect tends unnecessarily to increase the amount 
of confusion in our thought. 
(ii) Turning to our second example of confusion, let us 
consider the use of the term "experience" in two passages from 
the writings of c. Hartshorne. He states: 
Experience is social throughout, to its uttermost 
fragments or 'elements.' Ita very mode is a mode 
of sociability. Thus, for example, the very ob-
jectivity or over-against-us character of sensa-
tions, particularly visual, is nothing but a cer-
tain social otherness involved in them. Or, again, 
the •coldness' of green, the 'distance' of blue, the 
'aggressiveness' of red, embody modes of variation 
fully explicable only in terms 8f experience con-
ceived as a social continuum. 2 
He says in a later passage: 
If the principle of continuity holds (and he be-
lieves it does], then the difference between my-
self and my neighbor is a difference of degree; 
and there will be some contents in my experience 
which are more and others which are less 'mine' 
rather than 'thine.• 21 
Hartshorne is thus opposing what he calls, in one place, "sheer 
----------
19. ;Q~Tri~., X, 16. 
20. PPS, 8. 
21. Ib., 191. 
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privacy." 22 
Just what does he mean by .''experience" here? What does it 
mean to say that "experience is social throughout, to its 
uttermost fragments or 'elements'," and that our sensations 
are fully explicable only in terms of "experience conceived as 
a social continuum"? 
Hartshorne does not mean merely that our experience is in-
timately related to objects external to it, for he rejects the 
view that experience is purely private. He is urging that our 
experience in its very· essence is social in nature. The world 
of objects which we are accustomed, in philosophy, to think of 
as external to us, make up somehow and to some extent the very 
stuff of experience. Thus our private world of awareness is 
scrambled together with the external world of objects. The 
entire process of interplay between what were formerly called 
subject and object constitutes what Hartshorne conceives of as 
experience. 
There is no difficulty with this view as long as we do not 
persist in demanding an understanding of just what is meant 
I 
by experience in the sense referred to above. But when we ask 1 
how it is that experience can be composed of a mixture of 
private awareness and objects of the physical world, we lose 
what light we seemed to have and once again begin to grope. 
We may certainly have a clear idea of experience as a purely 
22. PPS, 101. 
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private fact; and we may apprehend clearly just what we mean 
by external objects, that is, objects which exist in the world 
external to our private experiences. Thus far all may be clear 
and t h ere is no difficulty. But Hartshorne's view brings these 
two ideas together and merges them in such a manner that we are 
unable to lay hold upon anything concrete to which he is re-
ferring. His view is unwarranted because it is the outcome of 
• 1 a confusion of two distinct .ideas. 
Experience (or consciousness,or mind, or whatever other name 
we choose to give to it) is a concept which is separable in 
meaning from wh?t we mean by a social continuum. The former 
may of course be related to the latter, but cannot be defined 
or conceived at all in terms of the latter. We can think of it 
as wholly different and separate from what we mean by a social 
continuum. For example, I may think of my conscious life 
without in the slightest degree implying anything outside of it. 
Furthermore, I may think of my experiences, let us say, of 
colored objects as being caused by real things outside of my 
experiences without implying anything whatever to · the ·:effect 
that those colored objects are a part of my experiences. 
In dreams we have a case where there are mental objects not 
directly produced by external objects at all. To sum up this 
discussion thus far, we can think of mental images without in 
the least thinking of or implying the objects which cause or 
l stimulate those mental images; and we can think of external 
objects as intimately related to experience and producing in us 
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-iF· ' mental images without thinking of or implying our experience ! I 
/ itself; but try as we may, we cannot form any determinate or i 
I manageable idea of experience as a social continuum consisting 
I 
of the interplay between external objects and private aware-
1 ness. 
Hartshorne seems to sense a difficulty in his own position 
when he quotes the words 'mine' and 'thine' in the second ci-
I ta tion above. What does it mean to say 'mine' and 'thine'? 
If these words do not refer to private experiences they are 
I 
i\ 
\I 
II 
meaningless. And if no experience is purely private we cannot 11 I 
II properly speak of it as mine or thine. It has no home, so to · 
speak. 
I I. But let us pursue this view that contents of "my experience" 
can be more 'thine' than 'mine' to the bitter end. There is 
obviously contradiction in calling "my experience" more 'thine' ] 
than 'mine' unless these latter terms bear some cryptic meaning J 
which is entirely different from their usual connotation. Per-
haps ari illustration will clarify both what Hartshorne means 
and the difficulty inherent in his position. 
Suppose a friend and I visit together at the Fogg Museum 
of Fine Arts in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where there is a 
famous Rembrandt painting of an old man. Suppose my friend has I 
i 
::d:e: o::::::\::::: t:; :::b::::~ ~ s w::::h :n:e t::: sIs ::::h::: • 'I 
of the artist himself in the portrait. In short, he under-
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stands and appreciates far more than I do, though I look upon 
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the same object as he. Now, Hartshorne would probably say 
that what I see, when viewing the famous portrait, is less 
1 my experience than it is that of my friend. 
This illustration shows plainly that there is in Hartshorne' 
view a confusion of two distinct ideas. The fact that one 
pergon knows more about an object, appreciates it more deeply, 
etc., does not imply that my more barren experience of that 
object is to a greater degree his than it is mine. The con-
elusion does not follow from the fact mentioned above. All 
that can be said is that my friend and I have different levels 
of experience though the object which we both see is the same. 
And it is vital to perceive that Hartshorne's view is not even 
needed to deal with all the complexities involved in our ex-
perience of external objects. The fact that experience is 
private does not in the least imply that it is free from es-
sential relations to external objects and can be most fruit-
fully understood in reference to those objects. 
The confusion between experience,on the one hand, and what 1 
is intimately related to experience, on the other, would not 
1
1 
be possible without one or both of the ideas before us having 
the character of vagueness. We have, then, another case of 
what results from being content with vague ideas and allowing 
them to characterize our knowledge. 
(d) Finally, the doctrine that vagueness characterizes 
knowledge is a source of ambiguity. One example will suffice 
to prove this point. Among the ideas which Whitehead has l ____ _ ----------------- ~------
I 
I 
I 
I 
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strongly insisted upon in his attack on the physical sciences 
of the past two centuries is what he calls the fallacy of 
"simple location." 23 Lovejoy, in writing upon this idea in 
Whitehead 1 s thought, declares: 
At least seven distinguishable senses of 'simple 
location' and its antithesis seem to me to be in-
timated. I do not mean that these are all incon-
sistent , but only that it is important to avoid 
confusing them, if we are to estimate the logical 
force of the argument. 24 
In a foot-note, also, Lovejoy points out that even Russell has 11 
been misled in his understanding of what vVhitehead means by ~~ 
25 1 
"simple location." 1 
I' 
I Lovejoy goes on, characteristically, to prove by direct 
citations that there are these various senses of the term in I 
I I~ II question. 
I is likely to use the same term in seven different senses,when 
For our purposes here the point is this. Nobody 
I 
he is attacking an important movement of thought, if he has a 
clear idea of wha t he intends. Ambiguity in philosophy has 
II 
long been recognized as a curse. This is because it is con- I 
tradictory and misleading. Vfuen, therefore, in a philosophical 1 
treatise an important term is used in seven different senses-- \ _ 
or when any philosopher of the acuteness of Lovejoy thinks tha t \1 
there are seven different senses of the same term--we must con- I 
elude that vagueness, on the part of the writer of that j 
23. S![VT ' 
24. RAD, 
25 . Ib., 
72, 84, 
159. 
168n. 
98. I I 
II 
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treatise, in apprehending the meaning of the idea in question r 
has been in part responsible. For if a writer has a clear hold 
upon his ideas he is not likely to fall into such ambiguity • 
. ~umm~~· Critical analysis of the chief arguments for the 
view that knowledge can be logically vague has shown that they 
are not sufficient to warrant that view~ Moreover, there are 
insurmountable difficulties withthat position: Knowledge can-
no~ to any extent be vague without to that extent ceasing to 
I 
1
1 
~e knowledge; the doctrine in question encourages an easy con- I 
I !j 
J tentment with vague ideas and with makeshifts for arguments; 1 
it blurs the line that marks off philosophy from the baseless 
opinions of mankind; it would b.ecome a fertile source of con- 1, 
fusion in our thought; and it would also be a source of am-
II bigui ty. We must conclude, therefore, that the position that 
11 
vagueness is to some extent a character of knowledge is un-
tenable and that it strikes a blow at philosophy itself. This 
I" cannot be tolerated by philosophy. Furthermore, when we ob-
serve that our ideas of life are already too much like a 'skein 
of silk with which a child has played,' we perceive that phi-
losophy cannot be forwarded in its goal'":"-its only worthy goal, 
of ministering to some of the most vital needs of humanity~-
by harboring the doctrine that vagueness characterizes,or can 
characterize, knowledge. 
Since Whitehead has made it a special point to assail some 
of the leading exponents and exemplars of clarity, notably 
II 
I' 
I 
I 
__ __j 
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i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Descartes, Locke, and Hume, and since he has argued that these 
men have led us astray by their emphasis on clarity, 26 this 
chapter would not be complete without one further comment. The 
analysis presented in Chapters II and III concerning the re-
lation between clarity and knowledge, and the conclusion re-
do to knowledge? What does it permit us to include in knowl-
edge? Does it allow any important place for knowledge of 
II what humanity most values? This problem is treated in the 
II following chapter, Chapter VI. 
26. Cf. AOI, 225. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE SCOPE OF KNOV~DGE 
) Introduction. The purpose of this chapter is to consider 
whether or not the position maintained in this inquiry re-
quires us to exclude knowledge of topics which, though im-
portant for humanity, contain special difficulties for 
knowledge. \Vhat are some of the typical subjects which might 
seem to lie beyond the reach of knowledge as here conceived? 
From some quarters it may be urged that if clarity is essential 
to knowledge and vagueness cannot in the least characterize 
knowledge, we thereby close the door to knowledge (1) of what 
we ought and ought not to do, (2) of other minds, and (3) of 
God. The list could be multiplied, but that is not necessary 
since these three topics contain typical difficulties. 
It is not our purpose here to present an elaborate and 
detailed account of the subjects which seem difficult for our 
knowledge to penetrate. But it is necessary to examine with 
sufficient care for the purposes at hand the three topics 
mentioned above. All that this chapter must do is to face 
the problem before us and to suggest how, if possible, it may 
be solved. At the outset, then, it must be emphasized that 
we propose here merely to indicate and illustrate by actual 
procedure, if possible, how we may overcome the special dif-
----
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ficulties involved in the process of gaining knowledge of the 
three topics referred to above. For from the standpoint of 
this inqu~ry it is important to show that if knowledge of these 
topics is accessible to us at all it 'mus.t be secured in terms 
of the requirement here maintained. 
Before turning directly to this main problem concerning the 
scope of knowledge, however, let us consider, by way of review, 
just wrillt the requirement urged in this inquiry does to knowl-
edge. Vfuat does it allow us to include in and what does it 
demand that we exclude from knowledge? 
It permits us to include every belief that is well-grounded. 
(We have already shown that in order for a belief to be well-
grounded we must know clearly what the belief is and what the 
grounds for it are.) Any object of such belief is an object 
of knowledge. Our requirement excludes from knowledge all 
forms of prejudice, that is, all beliefs based upon likes and 
dislikes rather than upon a perception of things as they are. 
It excludes unfounded and unwarranted beliefs. It excludes 
all beliefs which are vague or which rest upon grounds ap-
prehended to any extent vaguely. 
But some would go so far as to argue that if we exclude 
vague beliefs and beliefs based upon grounds apprehended 
vaguely, we simply bar the door against all knowledge. This 
is manifestly an exaggeration. For unmistakably we may have 
knowledge of formal relations such as those of mathematics 
and logic. Again, we may gain knowledge of phenomena of 
--
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nature. There is little serious question but that our knowl-
edge, as conceived in this inquiry, can reach objects of these 
two regions. In view of discussions above touching upon such 
knowledge we need not elaborate upon it here. 1 
It might seem, however, that the position maintained in this 
dissertation requires us to exclude knowledge of such objects 
as those already mentioned, namely, (1) knowledge of what we 
ought and ought not to do, (2) of other minds, and (3) of God. 
(1) }!ust We Rule out Knowledge of What RLQught and Qught 
li~l_i£_~? The purpose here is not to prove that there is 
some supreme end, or that there are supreme ends, whereby we 
may determine what we ought and ought not to do. All that is 
here required is to show tha t if knowledge of what we ought and 
ought not to do is possible a·t al:t it ;must be possible in terms 
tnat are clear. Regardless of the view of knowledge that we 
hold, in order to gain knowledge of what we ought and ought 
not to do we require knowledge that some end or other, some 
I 
goal or other, is the supreme end or goal toward which acts 
ought to be directed. Without this there is no such thing as 
knowledge of any kind as to what we ought and ought not to do. 
we are warrented, for our purposes here, therefore, in assum-
ing that we do have knowledge of an end(or of ends) which is 
(or which are) supreme. 
1. Vide supra, 31-47, and 57-61. 
1-·-
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We assume, then, at the outset that we may know some end 
or ends to be the supreme objects toward which acts ought ·to 
be directed. (That there is such knowledge may, in the view 
of the writer, be proved, but the difficult and complicated 
process of arguing the point, as we have seen, is not necessa~ 
here and would lead us far afield.) Once such knowledge is 
accepted, we are able to determine what we ought and ought 
n·ot to do by considering whether or not an act would or would 
not tend to result in the attainment of the end or ends re-
garded as supreme. This point must be made clearer. 
Some of our beliefs concern matters of fact. Others have 
to do with matters of obligation, of what we ought and ought 
not to do. Beliefs about matters of fact are justified, if 
at a ll, because experience, in order to be coherently under-
stood, requires them. That is, such beliefs are justified by 
the ultimate, bottom belief that what experience demands for 
its coherent interpretation is solidly based. 
When we turn to the sphere of obligation we confront a 
strangely different situation. We leave the region of fact, 
in a sense, and enter that of what ought to be fact. The 
fact that something is, has as such nothing whatever to do 
with what ought to be. For a fact is a fact and there is an 
end of it. All that the physical sciences say could be true 
without the question of obligation being touched upon at all. 
YVhat we ought or ought not to do, then, is a question of a 
very different nature from the existential one. 
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But while there is this difference, we do entertain beliefs 
not only about what is but about what we ought and ought not 
to do. How can we know, how can we gain well-grounded beliefs 
as to wha t we ought and ought not to do? We have seen that 
all beliefs about matters of fact that amount to knowledge are 
based upon some bottom belief which itself holds good because 
if it is denied no beliefs about the external world can be 
valid, nor ca n we in such a case gain any coherent account of 
what we experience. ·when we consider what we ought or ought 
not to do, similarly, we find tha t all of our obligations 
have t he ir basis ultimately in some supreme obliga tion, in so 
duty which like a king rules over all the others. All our 
lesser oughts are warranted or not in reference to some su-
preme ought, some supreme end. Just as we reach bottom, find 
some ultimate belief, as rega rds matters of fact, so there is 
a bottom belief (or, for some, there are bottom beliefs) as 
regards matters of obligation. Beyond this we cannot go. 
Once more, we may assume here that there is such a thing 
as knowledge of some supreme end or ends. While writers on 
ethics have differed as to what end is supreme, let us suppose 
for the sake of argument, that the ultimate goal toward which 
all action should be directed is the happiness of mankind. 2 
2. There are, to repeat, writers on ethics who would reject 
this as the supreme end of morality. Brightman, for instance, 
would make rationality in choice of values the ultimate duty. 
But our argument would not be helped by considering other 
theories, for something must be regarded as the supreme end 
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This is a typical position, and in what follows we shall be 
confronting the same sort of problems that we would have to 
face if we set up some other end as supreme. 
If for the sake of argument we assume that the happiness of 
mankind is the supreme end, then what we ought or ought not to 
do depends upon whether or not and to what extent our acts pro-
mote or hinder the attainment of that goal. Hence, the ques-
tion before us resolves itself into this: Can we gain well-
grounded beliefs about acts wnich promote or hinder the at-
tainment or the supreme end? Or, may we have knowledge about 
the consequences of acts in terms of the happiness they tend 
to produce? To this question we must immediately add another: 
And is that knowledge clear? 
First of all it seems evident that we must have a clear 
grasp of what we mean by "happiness of mankind." Without 
clarity here, we cannot determine whether or not acts do in 
fact promote the attainment of the supreme end; for without 
clear apprehension of what we mean, of what we have in mind, 
by "happiness of mankind," we cannot measure possible acts 
by any fixed standard.- For instance, we might mean the hap-
piness of individual people. Or, we might mean the happiness 
of all people for short periods of time, such as the present. 
Or, we might mean the happiness of the largest number of 
people in the long run. Moreover, we might mean any one of 
a number of things by "happiness." We might mean merry-making 
and frivolity. we might mean pleasure on the level of the 
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lower animals, such as the pleasure to smell, taste, sex, etc. 
•Ne might mean by "happiness" whatever in the long run brings 
satisfaction to people, such as bodily health, appreciation of 
beautiful objects, companionship, creative work, play, etc • 
. We need not carry the point further. Whatever we set up 
as the supreme end must be apprehended with clarity in order 
for us to have knowledge of what we ought and ought not to do. 
If we are hesitant about just what we mean by "happiness of 
mankind~' so that we do not know what in particular we in tend 
as the supreme goal of acts, then we cannot gain knowledge of 
what we ought or ought not to do. For in that case we simply 
have no fixed basis for estimating what ought and ought not to 
be done. we conclude, then, that we must have a clear grasp 
of what we mean by "happiness of mankind," that is, by the 
supreme end, before knowledge of what we ought and ought not 
to do is possible. 
Furthermore, we must have a clear hold upon the particular 
acts which we are thinking about performing before we can 
determine whether they will bring happiness to people or not. 
For our purposes here let us suppose that by"happiness of man-
kind11 we mean: whatever in the long run brings satisfaction 
to people, such as bodily health, appreciation of beautiful 
objects, companionship, creative work, play, and worship. 
Now, in order to know whether or not we ought to do a certain 
act, we must first know what that act is, what we mean by it, 
what particular act we have in mind. For without such ap-
prehension there is no valid way of measuring the consequences 
which would flow from ·the act. Moreover, we require to know 
clearly what particular act we are contemplating before we can 
determine its consequences. In so far as our idea of the 
nature of t n e act is vague, we cannot have knowledge of its 
consequences, and hence we cannot !~whether or not we ought 
to perform that a ct. For if, as we are supposing, the supreme 
end is the happiness of mankind, an act should or should not 
be done depending upon whether or not it is the best possible 
means in any given situation to that supreme end. And in so 
far as we do not apprehend clearly, but only vaguely, what 
t ne act in question is, we have no way of ascertaining whether 
or not it is the best possible means in any given case to 
the sup r eme end. 
It may of course be urged that we do not in many instances 
have time to trace ou~before we act>the consequences of an 
act. But this does not affect the above argument. For if we 
are to know that an act is the best means open to us for 
promoting in any given situation the happiness of mankind, 
we still must see clearly what that act is and what consequen-
ces would in all probability flow from it. 
Thus far, then, we have shown that we require a clear hold 
upon what we regard as the supreme end of moral action, and 
that we must apprehend clearly what particular act it is that 
we have in mind to do before we can know that that act ought 
to be done, or that it ought not to be done. 
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But the question might still be raised as to whether or 
not we can have a clear grasp of any ,supreme end. can we 
apprehend what we mean by the supreme end suggested, namely, 
the happiness of mankind, without any vagueness whatever in 
our hold upon that meaning? The answer seems unmistakably to 
be t.hat we can, :for we can define "happiness or mankind" so 
that it has for us a particular meaning which is identifiable, 
and which we will never confuse with anything else once we 
have seen that particular meaning. For example, we can define 
what we mean by bodily health, which is included under "hap-
piness of mankind." That is, we can apprehend what we mean 
by bodily health clearly, so that that meaning is specified 
and made distinct from other ideas. Similarly,we may ap-
prehend clearly what we mean by appreciation of beautiful 
objects, because we can attach to that phrase some defini~e 
meaning. we conclude, then, that it is possible to have a 
clear grasp of what we mean by "happiness of mankind." 
Moreover, we can apprehend clearly what act it is that 
we have in mind to do in any given situation. For instance, 
we may know clearly what it is to sign our name to a contract. 
The act is very simple. Further still, we may apprehend_ 
clearly what consequences will in all probability follow upon 
that act. We may not be able to apprehend all of them, but 
in any case our knowledge of what we ought or ought not to do 
can be based upon those only which we grasp clearly. 
=--==tt=-_:__=-=-=-=-- - ------- -:~--=----===---'--=-======= 
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The conclusion, then, would seem to be justified that if 
knowledge of )llfhat·we .. ought and ought not to do is possibleat all 
t it is :possible in terms of the requirement of this inquiry. 
The chief difficulties involved in gaining such knowledge 
have been sufficiently treated for the purpose at hand to lead 
us to see how they may be overcome. 
can there be such a thing as a well-grounded belief, for ex-
ample , tha t other minds exist, and is that belief together with 
its basis clear? It seems to be beyond reasonable doubt that 
we may apprehend clearly the content of that belief. For vre 
may entertain a clear idea of another mind and of existence. 
That is, we may know what we mean by another mind and by 
existence without any vagueness as to that meaning. This is 
not to say that we may have an exhaustive and detailed under-
standing of all that another mind is or of all that existence 
is. But these terms admit of clear apprehension. For example, 
a clear definition of another mind--though not the only defini-
tion--might be this: another mind is a consciousness external 
to my consciousness so that no part of the former can be a part 
of the latter; or another mind is one which is metaphysically 
distinct from and external to my mind. 
Exis tence too is a term which we may apprehend clearly. 
Existence is an ultimate, unanalyzable idea. Whatever is in 
process may be said to exist. The moment we see that this 
quality of ~xi~1ingnes~ applies to anything in the world of 
l==:::ff===-===~========-·=----==-==--=======-======-------_--
133 
-·--
II 
process, the world of temporal flow, we see that it applies 
to our own minds. By analogy we see also what it means to say 
that other minds exist. we conclude that the belief that 
other minds exist is clear. 
\lf"hat about the basis for that belief? Is it also clear? 
We may apprehend clearly what the grounds for that belief are. 
For instance, the evidence for the existence of other minds is 
in our experience of external objects which we see, hear, 
laugh at, etc. We note that some external objects do things 
with their hands, make buildings, paint pictures, write 
poems, play musical instruments, and what our experience re-
ports of their activity cannot be coherently explained without 
inferring that another mind exists which makes possible the 
rema rkable acts which we observe. Similarly, we cannot co-
herently explain the sounds coming from certain external 
objects without inferring that other minds exist. The language 
they use expresses meanings which we can recognize and under-
st~nd, and from this we infer tha t there is another mind at 
the other end of the line. This evidence could be multiplied 
at great length, but enough has been said to show that we may 
apprehend specifically a nd without ambiguity or doubt just 
wha t evidence there may be in support of the belief that 
other minds exist. We conclude,therefore, that we may have 
a clear grasp of evidence, of what the grounds are, for the 
existence of other minds. 
·------·------·--------------
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view of knowledge urged in this inquiry is such that we must 
t rule out knowledge of God, which knowledge might on some 
other interpretation be included, is to deal a blow to that 
view. Our position requires us to affirm that if any knowl-
edge of God is possible, it is accessible in terms tha t are 
free from vagueness. But can our knowledge be clear? 
Von Hftgel suggests that it cannot. For he declares: 
Nothing can be more certain than that the richer 
a ny reality, the higher in the scale of being, and 
the more precious our knowledge of it, the more in 
part obscure and inexhaustible, the less immedi-
a tely transferable, is our knowledge of that reality. 3 
According to hmm our knowledge ·of the higher orders of beings 
is in part "obscure and inexhaustible. 11 Inexhaustible it may 
be without affecting our problem here. But is our knowledge 
of God inevitably obscure~ 
Now at the outset it must be admitted that what knowledge 
we can gain on the subject of God, if any, is incomplete, 
fragmenta ry, a nd radically limited. But since ignorance and 
knowledge are perfectly compa tible, this constitutes no 
s erious di ff iculty. In view of this limited character of our 
knowledge of God; if any there is, let us confine ourselves 
wholly to the belief t hat a supreme will worthy of worship and 
interested in the fate of people exists. 
3. EAPR , 11. 
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we are not here required to prove that such a being exists, 
but rather to show, if possible, that if there is knowledge of 
the existence of God that knowledge must be clear. At the out-
set it is manifest that before we can determine whether or not 
God exists, we require a clear definition of God. In the pre-
ceding paragraph we have suggested that God is a supreme will 
worthy of worship and interested in the fate of people. But 
we must apprehend clearly what we mean by "supreme will," by 
"worthy of worship," and by "interested in the fate of people," 
before we can ascertain whether or not the being in question 
exists. This -emphasis upon clarity as regards what we mean 
by God is essential irrespective of the particular definition 
that we accept. The above definition is merely suggested for 
the purposes of illustrating the point that we require a 
clear hold upon what we mean by God before we can argue con-
vincingly that he exists. 
But can the idea of God be apprehended clearly? Or, may we 
grasp clearly what we mean by God? We may not--in fact, we 
cannot--entertain a completely adequate idea of such a being 
as God. But our idea of God, or our ideas of God, may be 
clear since we may know exactly what we mean when we refer to 
God. To refer to the definition of God suggested above, we 
may apprehend clearly what we mean by a supreme will. By a 
supreme will . we mean a force greater than the sum total of all 
other forces, so that these other forces could never overcome 
that one supreme force or will. This is clear, for we know 
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exactly what we mean by it. When we say "worthy of worship," 
what clear meaning do we have in mind, or may we have in mind? 
No being can for us be worthy of worship, that is, worthy of 
our trust, our homage, our devoted service, unless he is in-
terested in the production and increase of value. This is of 
course to speak in human terms, to speak in the only terms of 
which we are capable. But what we mean here may be grasped 
clearly. To be worthy · of worship includes at the very least, 
then, supreme power directed toward the production and increase 
of value in the universe. Hence, included in the idea of 
God, as here contemplated, is an interest in the fate and 
destiny of people. For a being working for the production and 
increase of value cannot but be concerned over the fate of 
those who are realizers of value, "carriers of value." 
This analysis, which eould be carried much farther, is suf-
ficient to show that what we mean by God must be clear if we 
are to have knowledge that God exists, and that what we mean 
by God can be grasped clearly. We must now turn to the grounds 
of the belief that God exists and point. out: first, that we re-
require clear apprehension of the grounds for that belief, and 
second, that such apprehension is possible. 
Before we can determine whether or not God exists, we must 
t see clearly what the evidence for that knowledge is. In other 
words, if there is such a thing as knowledge of the existence 
of God, our apprehension of the grounds for that knowledge must 
be clear. Otherwise we cannot determine whether or not they 
1-· -- r---
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are either genuine or sufficient to justify the belief that 
God ex-ists. We are not here concerned with proving the ex-
istence of God. we require merely to show that if there is 
kno wledge of the existence of God our apprehension of the 
grounds mus't be clear. To show this consider an empirical 
argument for God that has been regarded by many as very 
strong. 
Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we are 
attempting to present grounds for the existence of a power 
o·ther than human that works for the increase of value in the 
lives of people. This would be a first step toward showing 
that a supreme power other than human works for the produc-
tion and increase of value in the universe. Moreover, for 
our purposes here, consideration of some grounds for the ex-
istence of a power other than human which "makes for righteou 
ness" is sufficient to bring out the difficulties which must 
be faced. Though it is true that in order to have an adequate 
definition of God we must include the idea that he is a 
supreme power, we may be justified pelow in applying the name 
God to a power other than human which is interested in the 
increase of value in people. 
The primary source of our evidence for the existence of 
such a God is religious experience. Does religious experience 
provide us with any positive evidence for the existence of 
God, and can that evidence be clearly apprehended? We have 
seen already that if any knowledge of God is possible, we must 
-------·--------·---------------------------------
138 
apprehend the grounds clearly. But can that evidence, for 
instance, from religious experience be apprehended clearly? 
we must answer this by turning to some particular evidence. 
If God exists we would expect that those who have most 
devotedly sought his guidanc"e, his help, his will, would be 
responded to in such a way that their lives reached a higher 
plane than is usually achieved by people. That , is, we would 
expect God, if he existed, to respond by stimulating the mind 
with a higher order of ideas about the purpose and importance 
of life than is usualiy found. We would expect an increased 
fortitude and strength of mind, that is, greater power to 
bear up under inevitable misfortunes, and more than usual 
s~lf-mastery. We would expect in those people who have most 
earnestly sought to communicate with and serve God a keener 
moral sense than is usually cultivated in people. We would 
expect a sense of release from the pressure of remembrance of 
evil deeds. We would expect a quickening of interest in 
the fortunes of other people. We would not expect perfection 
in these matters·, nor would we expect God to speak in just the 
way human beings do, nor respond in the way we do. But we 
would certainly expect noticeable gains in the lives of those 
who have pursued religion most seriously and consistently. 
\Vhen we turn from what we would exEect to what we in fact 
find, we see that there is definite evidence for the ex-
istence of God. The lives of the saints make this plain. 
They must be selected because their efforts to communicate 
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with God have been the most intense and persistent. Now, in 
order to show that this evidence can be clearly apprehended, 
we are here justified in presenting a clear, though not an 
elaborate or detailed account of that evidence. 
The lives of the saints show just the sort of results that 
we might expect if a God existed to respond to their prayers 
and efforts to communicate with him. 4 A careful and impar-
tial study of the lives of St. Francis, St. Teresa, John 
Wesley, Phillips Brooks, Kagawa, and Gandhi--to mention but a 
very few--would reveal that .!. · they · .··;. had in them more of 
greatness and less of smallness than is found in these who 
have not cultivated the religious life. There are perhaps 
rare exceptions to this, but the general tendency is unmis-
takable. That is, these saints have deepest concern for . 
what they conceive to be the highest happiness of others. 
There is less of self-interest in them than is found in most 
people. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the 
decrease of self-interest and the increase of interest in the 
happiness of other people is due to cultivation of religious 
faith. Similarly, cultivation of the religious life issues 
in an increase in power to endure hardship, to countenance 
obstacles, to maintain equanimity of mind. 
4. Cf. James, VRE, 475-509, for his conclusions on this sub-
Ject. For detailed evidence see· the numerous quotations in 
VRE which are selected with remarkable felicity. 
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I J many cases, such as those in which there are marked con-
l 
versions, the change of life is so pronounced, the elevation 
I 
of t ;he moral,emotional, intellectual, and religious quality 
I 
of 1 person is so great by contrast with what went before, 
thaf we would hardly think such progress within a single life 
pos/sible. The words of Saint Teresa about her own trans-
fo 4mation are quite typical. She says, 
I 
1 All those who knew me saw that I was changed; 
1 my confessor bore witness to the fact; this im-
provement, palpable in all respects, far from being 
hidden, was brilliantly evident to all men. As for I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
myself, it was impossible to believe that if the 
demon were its author, he could have used, in order 
to lose and lead me to hell, an expedient so con-
trary to his own interests as that of uprooting my 
vices, and filling me with masculine courage and 
other virtues instead, for I saw clearly that a single 
one of these visions was enough to enrich me with 
all that wealth. 5 
I 
1 In short, there are sharp, easily recognizable differences 
I 
between people before and after earnest cultivation of the 
r eligious life. In the lives of the saints the changes 
/wrought (whether climactic or otherwise) are on the whole so 
1distinctly for the better that an impartial intellect is 
~~·:r:y : : lilce.ly. to affirm that they have got in touch with a 
1 
power not themselves which, far from being contrary to man's 
I 
)_ nature, tends to awaken new and useful powers in people. 
I There is a quicken;ng of th 
I ~ e moral sense, a decrease in the 
J 
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5. In James, VRE, 22. See also a strikingly similar ut-
terance by Saint John of 'the c · 405. ross wh~ch is quoted on page 
I -
common forms of pettj ness manifested by acts of revenge, 
slanderous remarks, etc. Also there is nearly always in the 
saints a smaller amount of race prejudice than in most other 
people. The list could be multiplied to show the many points 
at which saints are superior to what they themselves were be-
fore cultivating the religious life as well as to other 
people. But enough has been said to show that beneficial 
results, results in remarkable harmony with man's na ture in 
6 its better aspects, do follow upon earnest cultivation of 
some high form of religious life. · 
There is nothing as regards the meaning of terms in the 
above account which is inherently vague, which does not admit 
of clear apprehension. For the terms £~ be given particula r, 
identifiable meanings. And all specifiable meanings can be 
apprehended clearly. We may conclude, then, that if there is 
knowledge of God it can be and must be clear. The what of 
that knowledge and the why must be apprehended clearly. 
(4) Ways of_Ex£ressing_Krrowled~. Before this chapter 
comes to a close, one somewhat different point from those 
6. Tyrrell would seem to be right in saying that the belief 
in God has arisen out of the religious needs of man's nature, 
"and so far as it it true to that nature it is justifiable by 
any philosophy that is true to the same." (LO, 73) In the 
light of the discussion in the text above, in view also of the 
fact that prayer has been so central a part in the lives of 
saints, another remark of Tyrrell's seems to the point and 
bea rs indirectly upon that discussion. He says, "Any ration-
alist explanation tha t would make prayer nonsensical, or would 
encourage laxity, or wQuld mqke hayoQ of the ordinary sane and 
sensible religious notlons ot· the falthful, is eo ipso con-
de~"_d:_ as not squaring with the facts • " ( TSC, 9 6) l 
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considered must be treated briefly. It might well be imag-
ined that if we adhere rigidly to the requirement of this in-
quiry we cannot easily find place for symbolism, myth, and 
poetic expression of our · knowledge • . Let us examine this ob-
jection. 
Our knowledge may be clear and admit of numerous forms of 
expression. Just as the same person may wear various types 
of garments according to the requirements of the occasion, so 
knowledge may be clothed in different kinds of linguistic 
robes to suit the many moods of humanity. 
Knowledge, when expressed for scientific purposes, must 
for the most part wear the stiff shirt and formal attire of 
technical language. But this same knowledge may be dressed 
to catch the eye, to stir our imagination, and to captivate 
our interest. Not only so, but for some purposes our knowl-
is best expressed in language other than the rigidly 
technical, that is, in the language of poetry, myth, symbol. 
The important point to be remembered is this: once our 
knowledge has been gained, we require to view it with the 
appropriate emotions, to see it through the medium of passion 
and imagination." To do this appropriate language is 
necessary, and in many cases this language will be that of 
poetry, myth, or symbol. 
In religion, for example, symbol has played a large role. 
Men have but a finite image of God. Their insights about 
God are at best but representative of him by way of analogy. 
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of God, the best we may hope for is that our finite image of 
him, which is presented chiefly for the practical purposes of 
religion,is truly representative of him by way of analogy. 
Turning to philosophy, it seems evident (particularly in 
the light of the state of human relations in this year, 1940) 
that philosophy, if it is ever to fulfil its mission of guiding 
people toward a world in which impartial intelligence and 
reason prevail, must be diffused from one end of society to 
the other. As Matthew Arnold would say, it must be made "ef-
ficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned," 7 
yet without losing anything in the way of validity. To do 
this philosophical ideas must not merely be expressed in the 
rigid garb of technical language, but must be clothe'd also in 
symbol and myth and poetry. For only so can the majority of 
people see the ~alQe o f ' th6s~ ~ ideas .. for the living,breathing 
of affairs. Plato's .recourse to myth, then, does not neces-
sarily imply (though it may suggest) an abandonment of clarity. 
The only requirement of this inquiry as regards the manner 
of expressing knowledge is this: all knowledge, however it is 
expressed, must be clear; for purposes of precise communica-
tion the words used must be clearly defined; and all language 
that we employ in expressing our knowledge, whether symbolic, 
mythical, or poetic, must always be reconcilable with what 
we have gained by analysis. 
7 . PAP, 281. 
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The purpose of this inquiry is to consider whether or not clarity is 
e~ential to knowledge, and whether vagueness can in the least characterize 
knowledge. 
The t'ask of Chapter I is to define the three primary concepts of this 
study, namely, (1) knowledge, (2) clarity, and (3) vagueness. Knowledge 
is a kind of belief. It is the kind of belief that is seen to be true and not false, 
and this kind of belief, which is knowledge, is to be called well-grounded 
belief. Knowledge is thus a term within the subject-matter of logic. 
Clarity applies only to representations and not to external objects. There 
are two kinds of clarity that need to be distinguished here, namely, sensory 
clarity and logical clarity. While this inquiry is concerned only with the 
latter, the former must be considered to avoid confusion of these two possible 
meanings of the term. Any appearance is clear that has the cha-racter of 
definiteness, of determinateness in nature, and that has sharply defined and 
easily recognizable limits. This is sensory clarity. Logical clarity, on the other 
hand, applies to the meaning of our ideas or concepts. An idea, logically 
speaking, is conscious content with a meaning that goes beyond itself. An idea 
or concept is clear when the mind apprehends specifically and without am-
biguity or doubt what that concept refers to, what is intended by it. This is 
the second fundamental definition of the present study. 
Since the term vagueness may ·be applied in various ways, it is desirable 
to distinguish between its meanings and thus 'avoid any confusion about what 
is intended by vagueness for the purposes of this inqull-t. Three kinds of 
vagueness may profitably be considered here: sensory vagueness, verbal vague-
ness, and logical vagueness. The definitions of these in the order given im-
mediately follow. Any sensory appea-rance is vague that is indefinite, in-
determinate, and not well-defined in nature. Words are vague in so far as 
there is doubt about the limits and extent of their applicability whenever. an 
attempt is made to define them. But neither of the. above definitions is what 
is most required here. Logical vagueness, like logical clarity, applies to the 
meaning of ideas. An idea is vague when the mind does not perceive exactly 
what it intends by that idea, when every effort to specify its meaning leaves 
the mind hesitant and unsettled as regards that meaning. This is the third 
fundamental definition of the dissertation. 
The relation between clarity and knowledge is considered in Chapter II. 
It is there pointed out that clarity is essential to all well-grounded belief, or 
to all belief that is seen to be true. For it is necessary to apprehend clearly 
the what and the why of knowledge, the content and the grounds of knowl-
edge. If the mind does not grasp clearly what is known, it has no way of 
determining whether or not it is really known. If the mind does not perceive 
clearly what the grounds for knowledge are, it cannot determine whether or 
not they are genuine grounds. 
Clarity is essential to the two distinguishable levels of knowledge, namely, 
knowledge with the warrant of certainty and that with the warrant of prob-
ability. Reference to the latter is particularly important since some might 
imagine that clarity (though essential to certainty) is not essential to it. But 
careful analysis shows that in the case of probability there must be clear 
apprehension of what is believed to be probable, of the alternatives to that 
belief, and of the evidence for that belief and for the alternatives. 
Chapter III contains an account of other considerations than those men-
tioned above that lend weight to the position that clarity is essential to knowl-
edge. While the following arguments are not as fundamental as those of 
Chapter II, they lend support to that position: ( 1) Disagreement among 
philosophers calls for an emphasis on clarity as essential to knowledge. (2) 
Clarity in knowledge is required for intelligible communication. ( 3) The suc-
cess of mathematics is a telling example of what happens when the view that 
clarity is essential to knowledge is taken seriously. ( 4) The success of scientific. 
method is another convincing example of what happens when that view is 
put into effect. (5) What success philosophy has had, in the form of decisivP. 
additions to knowledge, has been possible only when clarity was emphasized. 
' But it might be urged that while clarity is essential to knowledge, vague-
ness may to some extent characterize knowledge. Nobody believes that there 
is a kind of knowledge that is entirely vague, but Whitehead and Russell 
affirm that all knowledge is to some extent vague. This position is stated in 
Chapter IV. The chief reasons for Whitehead's view are these: ( 1) 
Vagueness characterizes the empirical grounds of our knowledge. (2) The 
deeper aspects of reality lie beyond the reach of clarity. (3) The essential 
togetherness of things calls for the view that whatever can be made clear is 
abstracted from a larger whole in which alone it has its proper setting. Clarity 
thus distorts the picture of reality, for it succeeds only by taking things out 
pf their context. This results in distortion, for all things are what they are 
because · of where and when they are, because of their interrelations with and 
in the whole universe. ( 4) Inclusiveness, therefore, is required above all else, 
even in considerable measure at the price of clarity. For unless some vagueness 
is allowed in knowledge, what knowledge we claim will consist of trivialities 
and not metaphysics. (5) Mysticism has a ~ight to be heard, and mysticism 
offers a kind of knowledge that is in large measure vague. 
' Whitehead's and Russell's position that knowledge is somewhat vague, 
is critically evaluated in Chapter V . Their view is rejected as untenable 
because of the following considerations : ( 1) Knowledge cannot itself in the 
least be vague without ceasing to be knowledge. That is, where the vagueness 
begins knowledge ceases. For if logical vagueness is allowed in the what of 
knowledge, in so far there is no way of determining that our knowledge is 
genuine. And if vagueness is allowed in the apprehension of the grounds of 
knowledge, there is in so far no way of ascertammg whether or not the 
grounds are either genuine or sufficient. This argument is decisive when it is 
seen that vagueness is such that the law of contradiction cannot be applied 
to it. (It must be added, however, that there may be knowledge of something 
that is vague, in the sensory connotation of that term, without logical vague-
ness characterizing knowledge in the least.) (2) Though clarity is gained by 
abstraction this can neither disqualify it as essential to knowledge nor justify 
in the least the position that knowledge can be to some extent vague. ( 3) 
Nothing is gained for philosophy by the doctrine that knowledge is or can be 
somewhat vague. ( 4) There are insurmountable difficulties accompanying this 
position. (a) It encourages an easy contentment with vague ideas and make-
shifts for arguments. (b) It blurs the line that marks off philosophy from the 
baseless opinions of mankind. (c) If accepted, it would become a fertile 
source of confusion and ambiguity in our thought. The conclusion to be 
drawn is, then, that vagueness cannot in the least characterize knowledge. 
But it might be urged that if the requirement of this inquiry holds good, 
many important topics must be excluded from the reach of knowledge. This 
objection is examined in Chapter VI. From some quarters, for instance, it 
might be urged that the door has been closed to knowledge ( 1) of what ought 
and ought not to be done, (2) of other minds, and ( 3) of God. These contain 
typical difficulties. Analysis of the problems involved shows that if knowledge 
of these topics is p~ssible it must be possible in terms that are clear. Whether 
or not there is such knowledge is an interesting question but not one with 
which this inquiry is required to deal. 
It might still be argued that symbolic, mythical, and poetic expression of 
knowledge must be ruled out, if the position here adopted is correct. But all 
that that position requires is that l{nowledge be clear, that when knowledge 
is expressed for purposes of precise communication the language must be 
clearly defined, and that any expression of knowledge must be reconcilable 
with what has been gained by analysis. Once knowledge has been gained, 
it may be expressed to suit any of the appropriate moods of humanity. 
Conclusions of 'This Dissertation. ( 1) Knowledge, by its very nature, 
involves clarity. Apprehension of both the what and the why of knowledge 
must be logically clear. (2) Logical vagueness cannot in the least characterize 
knowledge. (3) If knowledge of what ought and ought not to be done, of 
other minds, of God, or of any other subject is possible it must be possible 
in terms of conclusions ( 1) and (2). 
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